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The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: A Toothless Tiger?
Kristen D.A. Carpenter*
Great nations like great men must keep their word. When
America says something, America means it, whether a treaty or
an agreement or a vow made on marble steps.
- President George Bush'
I. Introduction
A. Background
In late November 1996, an elderly Danish gentleman named
Flemming Ralk was extradited from Germany, where he had been
arrested while on a business trip and held for about nine months,
to Lincolnton, Lincoln County, Georgia. He awaited trial in the
Lincoln County Jail on charges of international fraud. The County
detained him for sixty-six days before he was ultimately tried and
acquitted. During the time Mr. Ralk was detained, thousands of
miles from his Copenhagen home, the jail denied him the medical
care and treatment he repeatedly requested and prevented him
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Law School, Dean Nancy B. Rapoport of the University of Houston Law Center, and
Assistant Professor Catherine A. Rogers of the Louisiana State University, Paul M.
Hebert Law Center, for reviewing and commenting on drafts of this article. The faculties
of the law schools at which this article was presented, including Stetson University
College of Law, the University of Washington School of Law, Nova Southeastern Law
Center, and Texas Wesleyan School of Law, provided valuable comments and insight as
well. Finally, I thank my colleagues and friends at Altman, Kritzer & Levick, P.C. and
the late Mr. Flemming Ralk, whose courage, dignity, and determination continually
inspires me.
I Inaugural Address of 1989, in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS FROM
1789 TO 1989, S. Doc. No. 101-10, at 345, 349 (1989). It was during the Bush
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from communicating with his family, even over the Christmas and
New Year's holidays. As a further indignity, the jail refused to
issue sufficient clothing to Mr. Ralk. Instead, he was forced to
gather and wear the soiled garments other inmates had discarded.
Mr. Ralk suffered debilitating, permanent emotional and physical
injury. He was unable to work, and his family described him as "a
broken man." My colleagues at Altman, Kritzer & Levick, P.C.
and I represented Mr. Ralk in the litigation that stemmed from his
detention.
Because Mr. Ralk was a citizen of a foreign nation, he brought
suit under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights.2 Mr. Ralk sued Lincoln County, its
sheriff, and its chief jailer in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Georgia in Augusta, Georgia. The district
judge assigned to the matter viewed Mr. Ralk's International
Covenant claim with great concern. Early in the case, the court
sought guidance from the parties as to the appropriate role for the
International Covenant to play in the litigation. The court's
concern was based upon one of the declarations the United States
Senate attached to the Covenant during the ratification process,
which stated that the Covenant was to be deemed non-self-
executing, and on United States federal case law giving force to
this declaration. Based upon this body of law, the court began the
case with the assumption that Mr. Ralk could not bring a civil
action to enforce the International Covenant. Along the same lines,
the court repeatedly characterized Mr. Ralk's case as "just a
simple prison case" to which it believed Mr. Ralk was attempting
to attach undue significance. In conversations with his attorneys
during these difficult times, Mr. Ralk, referencing specific
provisions of the Covenant, asked, "Don't these promises mean
anything?" This article is an attempt to answer Mr. Ralk's
question.'
2 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(hereinafter "International Covenant," "Covenant," or "ICCPR"), adopted Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368, 368-83.
3 Using the same argument that I present in this article, Mr. Ralk demonstrated to
the court's satisfaction that he could indeed bring suit under the International Covenant,
using the treaty prong of the Alien Tort Claims Act to provide the enabling legislation
otherwise missing from the Covenant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994) (hereinafter the
"Act" or "ATCA"). Beginning on February 23, 2000, an Augusta, Georgia jury heard
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Since the United States ratified the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights in 1992, American courts and scholars
have struggled with the proper meaning to be given the Covenant,
especially in light of the Senate's declaration that the Covenant is
to be deemed non-self-executing (hereinafter the "Declaration").
This article attempts to provide a comprehensive analysis of what
it means for the International Covenant to be non-self-executing,'
how the Covenant is currently being employed in United States
courts, given this limitation,5 and how the courts may, consistent
with the Senate's intention, nevertheless honor the commitments
the United States made to the international community when it
ratified the Covenant.' I present and critique the proposals of other
scholars and then provide a proposal of my own. Like several
other scholars, I believe part of the answer lies in using the Alien
Tort Claims Act7 to provide a cause of action to alien plaintiffs
under the Covenant. Other theorists have asserted that aliens may
bring suit under the first, or "customary international law," prong
of the Act because the Covenant is part of the body of customary
international law.8 What makes this article unique is its primary
focus on the Act's virtually ignored second, or "treaty" prong,
under which I propose that aliens may bring suit directly for a
treaty violation, without engaging in a limiting customary
Mr. Ralk's case. After a three-day trial, the jury awarded Mr. Ralk $100,000. Following
the verdict, the local newspaper denounced the defendants as having mismanaged the jail
and called for immediate reform. See Lincoln County Disgrace, AUGUSTA CHRON. Feb.
27, 2000 (Opinion) at A4 (calling the jail's treatment of Mr. Ralk "an inhumane
abomination that disgraces not only Lincoln County, but our state and nation"); see also
Sandy Hodson, Jury Says Sheriff, County Violated Rights, AUGUSTA CHRON. Feb. 25,
2000 (Metro) at B I (reporting the outcome of the trial). The attorneys' fees portion of the
case is ongoing. Mr. Ralk's is the only case of which I am aware in which conditions in a
United States jail have been found to violate the International Covenant.
4 See discussion infra Part II, Examining What it Means for a Treaty to be Non-
Self-Executing.
5 See discussion infra Part III, Current Application of the International Covenant
in United States Courts.
6 See discussion infra Part IV, Pursuing an International Covenant Claim in Light
of the Non-Self-Executing Exception.
7 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
8 See discussion infra Part IV (C) (1), Using the ATCA to Bring Suit Under
Customary International Law.
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international law analysis that dilutes the Covenant's effect as the
supreme law of the United States.9
B. The International Covenant
The purpose of the International Covenant, as stated by the
United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, is to
guarantee "a broad spectrum of civil and political rights, rooted in
basic democratic values and freedoms, to all individuals within the
territory or under the jurisdiction of the States Party without
distinction of any kind, such as race, gender, ethnicity, et cetera."'
As the Committee further stated, "[t]he Covenant obligates each
State Party to respect and ensure these rights, to adopt legislative
or other necessary measures to give effect to these rights, and to
provide an effective remedy to those whose rights are violated.""
The United Nations General Assembly adopted the
International Covenant unanimously and opened the Covenant for
signature on December 19, 1966.2 The International Covenant
came into force on March 23, 1976, and was registered that same
day.' 3 There are currently 60 signatories and 144 parties to the
treaty.'4 On April 2, 1992, the United States Senate gave its advice
and consent to the ratification of the treaty. 5 The United States
ratified the International Covenant on June 8, 1992, and the treaty
entered into force for the United States on September 8, 1992.6
The United States attached to its ratification five reservations, five
understandings, four declarations, and one proviso."
9 See discussion. infra Part IV (C) (2), Using the ATCA to Provide Enabling
Legislation for the International Covenant.
'0 SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE INT'L COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, S. EXEC. REP. No. 102-23, at 1 (1992), reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 645, 648.
1 S. EXEC. REP. No. 102-23, at 1-2, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 648-49.
12 31 I.L.M. at 645.
.3 Id.
'4 United Nations Millennium Summit, Multilateral Treaty Framework: An
Invitation to Universal Participation, at http://untreatyun.org/English/millennium/law/
index.html (June 15, 2000).
15 31 I.L.M. at 645.
16 See id.
"7 See S. EXEC. REP. No. 102-23, at 10-21 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645, 653-
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58. The exceptions the United States entered to the Covenant are summarized as follows:
The first reservation ensures that the International Covenant's prohibition of certain
propaganda will not contravene the First Amendment. See id. at 10-11, reprinted in 31
I.L.M. at 653. The second reserves the right to impose capital punishment for crimes
committed by persons aged 16 or older. See id. at 11-12, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 653-
54. The third limits the prohibition against cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment to the
conduct already prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. See id at
12, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 654. The fourth indicates that the United States will
continue to impose the punishment in effect at the time of an offense, rather than giving
the offender the benefit of any subsequent decrease in penalty. See id. at 12-13, reprinted
in 31 I.L.M. at 654. The fifth reservation limits the extent to which the United States
ensures the physical separation of juvenile and adult offenders. See id. at 13-14,
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 654-55.
The first understanding states that the United States considers its domestic anti-
discrimination and equal protection law to be consistent with the International
Covenant's requirements. See id. at 14-15, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 655. The second
indicates that, rather than undertaking the Covenant's obligation to provide a right to
compensation for illegal arrest and related state misconduct, the United States will
continue to provide simply a right to seek compensation. See id. at 15-16, reprinted in 31
I.L.M. at 655-56. The third clarifies that the United States believes its current detention
system to comply with the Covenant's requirement that pre-trial detainees and convicted
persons be separated physically, except under "exceptional circumstances." Id. at 16-17,
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 656. The fourth attempts to show that the Covenant's right to
secure counsel, right to obtain witnesses, and freedom from double jeopardy are
consistent with current United States law on point. See id. at 17, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at
656. The fifth understanding states that the Covenant's requirement that obligations be
extended to the several states will be interpreted so as not to interfere with the United
States' federal system. See id. at 17-18, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 656-57.
The first declaration, that the Covenant is to be deemed non-self-executing, is the
main focus of this article. See id. at 19, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 657. The second states
that the United States will not limit free speech and certain other rights as permitted by
the Covenant and urges the other Parties to take the same position. See id. at 19-20,
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 657-58. The third declares that the United States will accept the
competence of the Human Rights Committee to hear State-to-State complaints under the
Covenant. See id. at 20, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 658. The fourth clarifies the
relationship between the Covenant and other international law as it relates to citizens'
enjoyment of domestic natural wealth and resources. See id. at 20-21, reprinted in 31
I.L.M. at 658.
The single proviso, which was proposed by Senator Jesse Helms, states as follows:
"Nothing in this Covenant requires or authorizes legislation, or other action, by the
United States of America prohibited by the Constitution of the United States as
interpreted by the United States." Id. at 24, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 660; see also John
Quigley, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Supremacy
Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 1287, 1306-07 (1993). Professor Quigley opines as follows:
The intent of the proviso ... was to ensure that, even apart from those
provisions to which other qualification statements were made, the United States
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 26
The application of each of these types of exceptions 8 to the
provisions of the Covenant is controversial. The availability of
exceptions makes it possible for States to ratify treaties when they
might otherwise be unable (or unwilling) to do so, given the
differing obligations imposed by their own domestic law. The
following are some reasons why States choose to adopt
reservations:
"A State ... may wish to be a party to an international
agreement while at the same time not yielding on certain
substantive points believed to be against its interests."' 9
"A State ... may wish to be a party to an international
agreement while at the same time not binding itself to certain
procedural obligations, such as compulsory settlement of
disputes in the form specified in a compromissory clause."2°
"A State may wish to assure that its treaty obligations are
compatible with peculiarities of its local law."'"
would not consider itself bound by any provision of the Covenant that differed
from those contained in the U.S. Constitution. It thus appears to exempt the
United States from the obligation to protect a right more broadly than it is
protected by the U.S. Constitution.
Id. at 1307. 1 disagree with this interpretation of the proviso. Contrary to Quigley's
position, the proviso does not apply to all situations in which the Covenant imposes
greater obligations on the United States than the Constitution does; rather, it simply
prevents the United States, by adopting the Covenant, from accepting any provision of
the Covenant that the Constitution prohibits.
18 I have used the term "exceptions" to describe collectively each of the four
different kinds of modifications the United States has made to the Covenant. Another
scholar has chosen to use the term "amendments" instead. See M. Cherif Bassiouni,
Reflections on the Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights by the United States Senate, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 1169, 1177 (1993). I prefer the
term "exception" because "amendment" seems to imply a bilateral, contractual
interaction between the "amending" Party and other States Parties that does not take
place with respect to understandings, declarations, and provisos (although it may take
place with respect to reservations). In addition, the term "amendment" is a term of art,
and using it to describe all treaty exceptions may create confusion. See Richard W.
Edwards, Jr., Reservations to Treaties, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 362, 380 (1989)
("Reservations and treaty amendments are not the same things. An amendment may
lessen or expand obligations under a treaty, while a reservation normally seeks to reduce
the burdens imposed by a treaty on the reserving party.").
19 Edwards, supra note 18, at 363.
20 Id.
21 Id.
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"A State may want to preclude a treaty's application to
subordinate political entities in a federal system or to foreign
territories for which the State would otherwise have
international responsibility. 22
A survey of every case decided in the United States to date
under the International Covenant is attached as an appendix. The
cases cited therein suggest by their own terms that at least three of
the factors Edwards discusses, the first, third, and fourth, were
important to the United States in its ratification of the International
Covenant.
Although treaty exceptions may serve valuable purposes, the
use of exceptions has recently come under fire from the United
Nations, which has objected to the large number of exceptions the
various States Parties have attached to the International
Covenant.23  In addition, the United States has placed more
exceptions than any other country on three major human rights
22 Id. Focusing specifically on reservations, the United Nations Human Rights
Committee recognized similar considerations in its general comment on issues relating to
reservations made upon ratification or accession to the covenant or the optional protocols
thereto, or in relation to declarations under article 41 of the Covenant:
The possibility of entering reservations may encourage States which consider
that they have difficulties in guaranteeing all the rights in the Covenant
nonetheless to accept the generality of obligations in that instrument.
Reservations may serve a useful function to enable States to adapt specific
elements in their laws to the inherent rights of each person as articulated in the
Covenant. However, it is desirable in principle that States accept the full range
of obligations, because the human rights norms are the legal expression of the
essential rights that every person is entitled to as a human being.
U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 52d Sess., 1382d mtg., 4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/
Rev.l/Add.6 (1994), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 839, 841.
23 Id., % 1, reprinted in 34 I.L.M. at 840-41:
As of [November 1,] 1994, 46 of the 127 States [P]arties to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights had, between them, entered 150
reservations of varying significance to their acceptance of the obligations of the
Covenant. Some of these reservations exclude the duty to provide and guarantee
particular rights in the Covenant. Others are couched in more general terms,
often directed to ensuring the continued paramountcy of certain domestic legal
provisions. Still others are directed at the competence of the Committee. The
number of reservations, their content and their scope may undermine the
effective implementation of the Covenant and tend to weaken respect for the
obligations of States Parties.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 26
treaties it has ratified recently." Consequently, the international
community and American legal scholars have subjected the United
States to significant criticism.25
C. Giving the Tiger Some Teeth
One of the exceptions for which the United States has been
roundly criticized is a declaration providing that the International
Covenant is to be deemed non-self-executing.26 The first part of
this article analyzes what it means for a treaty to be non-self-
executing.27 As is further discussed below, despite the Senate's
relatively clear statement of what it intended the Declaration to
mean, courts employ a variety of their own interpretations. In
doing so, courts occasionally exclude even causes of action that
24 Bassiouni, supra note 18, at 1177 (noting that the United States has placed a
total of nine reservations, fifteen understandings, seven declarations, and two provisos on
these three treaties, which include the International Covenant on Civil and political
Rights, supra note 2, ratified in 1992, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027, ratified in 1994, and the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Mar. 7, 1986, S. EXEC. Doc. C, 95-2 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 195,
ratified in 1994); see also David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human
Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L
L. 129, 131 nn.7-13 (1999) (reporting the same phenomenon).
25 See, e.g., Bassiouni, supra note 18, at 1173-74. Bassiouni criticizes the United
States' liberal use of treaty exceptions as follows:
The Senate's practice of de facto rewriting treaties, through reservations,
declarations, understandings, and provisos, leaves the international credibility of
the United States shaken and its reliability as a treaty-negotiating partner with
foreign countries in doubt. United States treaty partners find themselves
confronted with what amounts to new treaty provisions or limitations which
were not part of their original perception of the treaty. The treaty partners have
no alternative but to accept the individual treaty as amended by the United
States Senate or to invoke international law to declare the reservation, proviso,
or however the Senate may wish to label its amendment, as incompatible with
the treaty's substantive legal obligations.
Id.
26 See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE INT'L COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, S. EXEC. REP. No. 102-23, at 19 (1992), reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 645, 657.
27 See discussion infra Part II, Examining What it Means for a Treaty to be Non-
Self-Executing.
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the Declaration, on its own terms, would permit.
The second portion of the article discusses the manner in
which the International Covenant is being applied in American
courts currently." American courts are not truly interpreting the
International Covenant, but assume its protections to be
coextensive with those already provided by the American
Constitution. Because of this phenomenon, American attorneys
have an incentive to bring suit under the more familiar framework
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, either instead of, or in addition to, the
Covenant, whenever possible.. Further, unfamiliarity with the
requirements of the Covenant by both attorneys and judges has
been a factor in the failure of the Covenant to play a more
prominent role in human rights litigation in the United States. The
result is that the International Covenant is not effectively
providing the protections it promises. The gap between rhetoric
and reality is particularly acute in cases against non-state actors,
which could not be brought under § 1983, but which may be
pursued under customary international law. Moreover, conflating
the requirements of the International Covenant with the
constitutional standards applicable to § 1983 cases erases subtle,
but important differences in the respective protections afforded by
the International Covenant and the United States Constitution.
The third and final part of the article discusses four possible
arguments for narrowing the gap between the International
Covenant's promises and the manner in which the Covenant is
employed in United States courts. The first is that the Senate's
actions in attaching the Declaration were ultra vires.29 The second
is that the Declaration is without effect because a Declaration,
unlike a Reservation, is not part of a treaty and does not therefore
bind the courts.3" Both arguments are flawed.
The final two arguments involve using the Alien Tort Claims
Act in one of two ways to provide a cause of action to "alien"3'
28 See discussion infra Part III, Current Application of the Covenant in United
States Courts.
29 See discussion infra Part IV (A), Claiming the Senate's Declaration is Ultra
Vires.
30 See discussion infra Part IV (B), Claiming the Senate Declaration is of No
Effect.
31 I put this term in quotes because part of my final argument concerns the extent to
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
plaintiffs. First, under the customary international law prong of the
ATCA, there is little doubt that the provisions of the International
Covenant constitute evidence of customary international law.
Although some courts have allowed plaintiffs to bring
International Covenant claims by demonstrating that the Covenant
is part of the body of customary international law, it is less than
satisfactory to consider the International Covenant, like matters of
comity, opinions of scholars, and court decisions, as just one of
numerous components of customary international law. When the
United States ratified the Covenant, it agreed to the specific terms
and conditions contained in the Covenant.3 2 Considering the
International Covenant as nothing more than "some evidence" of
customary international law limits the effect of the Covenant in a
manner inconsistent with its status as "the supreme law of the
land" and its purpose in protecting individual human rights.33
Second, alien plaintiffs may employ the treaty prong of the
ATCA in suits against United States defendants to provide the
enabling provisions missing from the International Covenant. 4
The United States Supreme Court has never decided either the
ultimate question of whether an individual may bring suit under
the International Covenant, or even the threshold question, on
which my argument relies, of whether an individual may bring a
private action under the ATCA.35
which the term "alien" may encompass persons other than foreign citizens, such as
Native Americans. See infra note 166.
32 See generally SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE INT'L
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, S. EXEC. REP. No. 102-23 (1992), reprinted
in 31 I.L.M. 645-61 (describing the major provisions of the International Covenant).
33 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Nevertheless, customary international law is the most
effective vehicle currently available for alien plaintiffs to bring suit against alien
defendants in United States courts. See discussion infra Part IV (C) (1), Using the ATCA
to Bring Suit Under Customary International Law.
34 See discussion infra Part IV (C) (2), Using the ATCA to Provide Enabling
Legislation for the International Covenant. As the discussion at Part IV (C) (2) notes,
this approach has been mentioned previously by others in passing. I have not, however,
seen this argument discussed elsewhere in depth.
15 At this time, United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998), represents the closest
the Supreme Court has come to addressing the intended effect of the Covenant on
domestic law. In Balsys, the Court alludes to the existence of a dispute regarding the
availability of private actions under the ATCA but expressly declines to express an
opinion as to the proper outcome. Id. at 695 n. 16. See infra note 125 for the lower court
[Vol. 26
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H. An Examination of What it Means for a Treaty to be Non-
Self-Executing
Plaintiffs bringing International Covenant claims currently
face a significant hurdle, as courts uniformly give effect to the
Senate's Declaration, holding the Covenant to be non-self-
executing.36 What it means, however, for a treaty to be non-self-
executing is a point upon which neither the courts nor the scholars
considering the question are able to agree, despite the relatively
clear language employed by the Senate in describing what it
intended the Declaration to mean. Indeed, courts limit the effect of
the International Covenant further than the Senate intended by
employing the Declaration in a broader manner than the Senate
contemplated.3"
In the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Report on the International Covenant, the Committee provides the
following statement of its intentions in recommending the
Declaration: "For reasons of prudence, we recommend including a
declaration that the substantive provisions of the Covenant are not
self-executing. The intent is to clarify that the Covenant will not
create a private cause of action in U.S. courts."3 In The Rule of
Non-Inquiry and Human Rights Treaties, John Quigley comments
upon the Senate Committee's Report, as follows:
The Supreme Court uses the term "self-executing" for treaty
clauses that provide rights upon which an individual party may
rely in court.
When the Senate provided that the ... [International Covenant
was] not to be "self-executing," it may have intended that the
[treaty's] provisions not be invoked before the courts under any
circumstances. However, after the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee approved the language that the International
debate on the threshold Alien Tort Claims Act issue.
36 See, e.g., Ralk v. Lincoln County, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1380 (S.D. Ga. 2000);
see also discussion infra notes 41-51 and accompanying text.
37 See discussion infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
38 SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE INT'L COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, S. EXEC. REP. No. 102-23, at 19 (1992), reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 645, 657 (emphasis added).
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Covenant should not be deemed "self-executing," the
Committee sent a letter to the full Senate explaining that in
keeping with the Covenant as self-executing, it intended only to
ensure that a private cause of action not be based on the
Covenant.9
According to the Senate's report and consistent with Quigley's
analysis, the Declaration should not, for instance, preclude a party
from raising the Covenant either defensively or through an
existing enabling law.4" Rather, the Declaration simply prevents a
plaintiff from raising the Covenant offensively when there is no
independent enabling law applicable. This interpretation of the
Declaration is consistent with the expressed intent of the United
States Senate in attaching the Declaration.
Some courts and scholars adopt the language of the United
States Senate Committee Report, holding that the International
Covenant simply creates "no private right of action."4' Others,
39 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 1213, 1230 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
40 Indeed, in the final section of this article I posit that, in actions by aliens against
United States defendants, it is appropriate to use the Alien Tort Claims Act to provide
the enabling legislation omitted from the Covenant's text. See John Quigley, Judge Bork
is Wrong: The Covenant is the Law, 71 Wash. U. L.Q. 1087, 1097-98 (1993) ("Even if
the Covenant was found not to create a private cause of action in U.S. courts, the
Covenant could nonetheless be invoked defensively by an individual against whom legal
action is being taken."). Quigley uses this asymmetry to argue that the law must be
changed:
There is little sense in a distinction between affirmative and defensive use of a
Covenant right. For example, if an individual may invoke a Covenant provision
on nondiscrimination as a defense against some adverse governmental action,
why would that same individual not be permitted to use the Covenant in
affirmative litigation to protect the same right?
Id. at 1100.
41 See, e.g., White v. Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380, 1385 (E.D. Wash. 1998) ("Where
Congress has not enacted authorizing legislation, a treaty gives rise to a cause of action
only if it is 'self-executing;' i.e., if it either expressly or impliedly creates a private right
of action to enforce rights described in the treaty.") (emphasis added); (citing Trajano v.
Marcos (In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Lit.), 978 F.2d 493, 503 (9th
Cir. 1992); Islamic Republic of Iran v. Boeing Co., 771 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir.
1985)); Calderon v. Reno, 39 F. Supp. 2d 943, 956 (N.D. 11. 1998) ("Treaties made by
the U.S. are the law of the land .... but if not implemented by appropriate legislation
they do not provide the basis for a private lawsuit unless they are intended to be self-
executing.") (emphasis added) (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F. 2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring)); Jama v.
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seeming to ignore the guidance provided by the Committee
Report, have adopted one of three different approaches: (1)
holding that, when a treaty is not self-executing, the plaintiff lacks
standing to enforce the treaty,4 2 (2) holding that a non-self-
executing treaty is not enforceable in United States courts, or (3)
holding that a non-self-executing treaty does not create privately
enforceable rights43 or is not the law of the land (the Restatement
view)." Each of these three formulations leads to a harsher result
United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 362 (D.N.J.
1998) ("Unless a treaty is self-executing, it must be implemented by legislation before it
can give rise to a private right of action enforceable in a court of the United States.")
(emphasis added) (citing Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 1976)); see
generally Sloss, supra note 24, at 144-52 for another scholar's analysis of how courts
have interpreted the term "non-self-executing".
42 See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 928 F.2d 1060, 1066 (11th Cir. 1991)
("We have held that a treaty must be self-executing in order for an individual citizen to
have standing to protest a violation of the treaty.") (emphasis added) (citing United
States v. Bent-Santana, 774 F.2d 1545, 1550 (11th Cir. 1985), abrogated on other
grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990); United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d
1258, 1268 (5th Cir. 1979)); Dickens v. Lewis, 750 F.2d 1251, 1254 (5th Cir. 1984) ("As
the court concluded, individual plaintiffs do not have standing to raise any claims under
the United Nations Charter and the other international obligations relied upon by
Dickens.") (emphasis added) (citing Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 850 (D.C. Cir.
1976)); Kyler v. Montezuma County, No. 99-1052, 2000 WL 93996, at *1 (I0th Cir. Jan.
28, 2000) (holding that the International Covenant's provisions "do not... confer rights
upon individual citizens and, thus, petitioner does not have standing to bring these
claims") (emphasis added) (citing Diggs, 555 F.2d at 851; Dickens, 750 F.2d at 1254).
43 See, e.g., Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 10 n.l (lstCir. 1994)
("Appellants' contention that their right to vote in the presidential election is secured by
Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ... is without
merit. Even if Article 25 could be read to imply such a right, Articles I through 27 of the
Covenant were not self-executing .... and could not therefore give rise to privately
enforceable rights under United States law.") (emphasis added); Dreyfus, 534 F.2d at 30
("It is only when a treaty is self-executing, when it prescribes rules by which private
rights may be determined, that it may be relied upon for the enforcement of such
rights.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted); In re Extradition of Cheung, 968 F. Supp.
791, 803 (D. Conn. 1997) (citing Dreyfus, 534 F.2d at 30, for the same holding, adding
that this treaty was "ratified with the express proviso that [it is] not self-executing....
Since Congress has not enacted any implementing legislation, Cheung may not rely on
them to avoid extradition").
44 See Richard D. Glick, Environmental Justice in the United States: Implications
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv.
69, 102 n.154 (1995) ("A treaty deemed 'non-self-executing' by the Senate will not be
given effect in U.S. courts, subject to the adoption of specific implementing legislation
by Congress.") (emphasis added) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
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than would the Senate Committee's approach, as each incorrectly
suggests that a party cannot raise the International Covenant either
defensively or using an existing federal statute such as the ATCA
to provide the necessary enabling provisions.
Adding further confusion to International Covenant
jurisprudence, some courts combine more than one definition
while giving the mistaken impression that they are conveying a
single meaning. The court in Jama v. United States Immigration
and Naturalization Service, for instance, in the same paragraph
first incorrectly suggests that "non-self-executing" means that no
rights have been created that private parties may enforce and then
correctly states that the phrase means simply that no private right
of action has been created." Not having a right "enforceable by
private parties" suggests that the rights created in the treaty may
not be raised by individuals even defensively, while not having a
"private right of action" implies that a plaintiff may bring suit
under another, enabling, cause of action.
The court in Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani46 confuses the
relevant analysis, as well. In granting the defendant's motion to
dismiss, the court first holds that "treaties are only enforceable in
United States courts if either the treaty is self-executing or the
Legislature passes legislation implementing the provisions of a
treaty."47 In the same opinion, the court later holds that "non-self-
executing treaties do not create a private right of action under
which the plaintiff can successfully state a claim."48 As clarified
above, the enforceability of a treaty and the availability of a
private right of action under a treaty are altogether separate
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 11 (4)(c), 303 (1987)). See infra note 96 for
the Restatement view.
45 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 362 (D.N.J. 1998) ("In order for a treaty to confer rights
enforceable by private parties it must be self-executing, that is, a treaty which requires
no legislation to make it operative. . . . Unless a treaty is self-executing, it must be
implemented by legislation before it can give rise to a private right of action enforceable
in a court of the United States.") (emphasis added) (citing Frolova v. Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1985); Dreyfus, 534 F.2d at 30).
46 33 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
47 Id. at 1256-57 (emphasis added).
48 Id. at 1257 (emphasis added).
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matters. 9 Further, in Ralk v. Lincoln County, the court compounds
an earlier United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
misconstruction of the Declaration as meaning that an individual
lacks standing to bring suit under the treaty."0 The Ralk court
describes this earlier, mistaken Eleventh Circuit holding as being
"consistent with the Bush Administration's [correct]
understanding of the term 'not self-executing"' as meaning that
the Covenant "will not create a private cause of action in U.S.
courts."5
The definition of non-self-executing a court employs is
critically important and can mean the difference between a
petitioner's life and death. Two recent United States District Court
cases, In re Extradition of Cheung and Maria v. McElroy iilustrate
this point, each case involves an alien's attempt to raise the
International Covenant defensively to avoid deportation." In the
Cheung case, because the court holds that the International
Covenant does not "prescribe rules by which private rights may be
determined," it prevents the petitioner from raising the Covenant
defensively and ultimately denies all relief.53 In the Maria case, by
contrast, the court holds that, "[a]lthough the ICCPR is non-self-
executing,... it is an international obligation of the United States
49 Similar issues are presented in United States v. Bent-Santana, 774 F.2d 1545
(11 th Cir. 1985). The Bent-Santana court holds that "it is a settled principle of both
public international law and American constitutional law that unless a treaty or
intergovernmental agreement is 'self-executing'-that is, unless it expressly creates
privately enforceable rights-an individual citizen does not have standing to protest
when one nation does not follow the terms of such agreement." Id. at 1550 (citing Foster
v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 313-14 (1829); Dreyfus, 534 F2d at'29-30); see also
Sloss, supra note 24, at 149-51 (analyzing the Bent-Santana court's interpretation of the
term "non-self-executing"). In doing so, the court conflates the "no privately enforceable
rights" and "no standing" formulations. Both are incorrect in light of the Senate's clear
explanation of how it intended the Declaration to function.
50 81 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1380 (S.D. Ga. 2000).
5' Id. (citing United States v. Thompson, 928 F. 2d 1060, 1066 (11th Cir. 1991);
SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE INT'L COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS, S. EXEC. REP. No. 102-23, at 19 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645,
657).
52 See In re Extradition of Cheung, 968 F. Supp. 791 (D. Conn. 1997); Maria v.
McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
53 968 F. Supp. at 803 n.17 (citing Dreyfus, 534 F.2d at 29-30).
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and constitutes a law of the land."54 Having so held, the court
grants the petition for writ of habeas corpus, finding that the
deportation would violate the International Covenant.55 The Maria
court's holding is consistent with the plain meaning of the United
States Senate declaration, while the Cheung court distorts the
Declaration.
III. Current Application of the International Covenant in
United States Courts
In its representations to the United Nations, the United States
claims that the International Covenant generally imposes few
obligations beyond those that the United States Constitution
already states. 6 Indeed, the United Nations Human Rights
14 68 F. Supp. 2d at 231-32 (citation omitted).
55 Id. at 234 (holding that "[t]he fact that the ICCPR creates no private right of
action does not eliminate the obligations of the United States and all of its branches of
government").
56 See S. Exec. Rep. No. 102-23, at 2-10 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645, 649-
53:
The rights guaranteed by the Covenant are similar to those guaranteed by the
U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
The overwhelming majority of the provisions of the Covenant are compatible
with existing U.S. domestic law.
In general, the substantive provisions of the Covenant are consistent with the
letter and spirit of the United States Constitution and laws, both state and
federal. Consequently, the United States can accept the majority of the
Covenant's obligations and undertakings without qualification.
Id. at 2, 4, 10, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 649, 650, 653. The representations of the
United States are echoed in the legal scholarship on the International Covenant.
Professor Neier notes as follows:
This lack of interest in the Covenant reflected the view that the protection
of liberty within the United States would not be noticeably affected by
international agreements, regardless of whether the United States became a
party to them. The ACLU, and other organizations concerned with civil
rights and liberties, then and now, considered that the liberties of
Americans have depended largely on the Constitution of the United
States ....
Aryeh Neier, Political Consequences of the United States Ratification of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1233,
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Committee criticizes the compliance of the United States with the
Covenant, on these very grounds. 7 The United Nations also
recently issued a Comment relating more generally to the issues of
treaty compliance and the use of treaty exceptions. 8
Courts take the matter further than is supported by the Senate
Committee Report, often proceeding on the assumption that the
International Covenant imposes no obligations beyond those
already imposed by the United States Constitution. Although the
court's holding in Ralk v. Lincoln County allows a private action
to be brought under the International Covenant, the court limits the
scope of the protection provided by the International Covenant to
be coextensive with United States domestic law. 9 It is likely that
the decision of the court is predicated on the dearth of United
1233 (1993). See also Michael H. Posner & Peter J. Spiro, Adding Teeth to United
States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The International
Human Rights Conformity Act of 1993, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1209, 1211 (1993)
("[T]he Covenant on Civil and Political Rights... draw[s] heavily on our own Bill
of Rights and the United States' long tradition of protecting individual human rights.
As a result, the Covenant is almost entirely consistent with the U.S. Constitution,
protecting many of the same rights."); along the same lines, the Restatement (Third)
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States provides as follows:
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires state parties to
the Covenant to respect and ensure rights generally similar to those protected by
the United States Constitution. Some provisions in the Covenant parallel
express constitutional provisions, for example, the freedoms protected by the
First Amendment and the prohibition on double jeopardy....
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra
note 44, at § 701 n.8.
57 Comments on the United States ofAmerica, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d
Sess., 1413th mtg., 14, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.50 (1995) ("The Committee regrets
the extent of the State Party's reservations, declarations, and understandings to the
International Covenant. It believes that, taken together, they intended to ensure that the
United States has accepted what is already the law of the United States.").
58 See General Comment Adopted Under Article 40 On Issues Relating to
Reservations Made Upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant on the Optional
Protocols, or in Relation to Declarations Under Article 41 of the Covenant, ( U.N.
GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 52d Sess., 1382d mtg., 21, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.6 (1994), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 839, 846 ("[I]nterpretive
declarations or reservations [should not] seek to remove an autonomous meaning to
Covenant obligations, by pronouncing them to be identical, or to be accepted only
insofar as they are identical, with existing provisions of domestic law.").
59 81 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1381 (S.D. Ga. 2000).
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
States case law interpreting the International Covenant. The Ralk
case arises under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Articles 7 and 10 of
the International Covenant. Noting the reservation of the United
States to Article 7 (limiting the definition of "cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment" to include only that conduct already
prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments), the
court holds that the plaintiff's claims under Article 10 (regarding
"inherent human dignity") "should be measured by the same well-
honed standards that our Constitution requires," notwithstanding
the fact that no reservation was entered to Article 10 to limit its
effect to what domestic law already required (indeed, no
reservation whatsoever was entered to that provision).6" The Ralk
court, taking note of a reservation to one Article of the Covenant,
then applies that same limitation to an unrelated Article to which
no reservation was entered. In so holding, the court dismisses
Article 10 as "nebulous" and "open-ended," perhaps because the
Article was unfamiliar to the court or because current United
States case law does not provide a clear standard of proof for
International Covenant claims.6 The court then expresses its
understanding that the Covenant was intended to provide no rights
beyond those already protected by domestic law with the
statement that this "reading ... is entirely consistent with our
domestic law, as the President intended."62 The discussion below
60 Id. at 1381-82 (holding that, "[w]hile it is conceivable that Article 10 requires
some higher degree of medical care than that required by our Constitution, the Court
finds no reasonable basis for such a conclusion").
61 Id. at 1382.
62 Id. (emphasis added) (holding that "[t]he Court... is very skeptical of charting
out a new course in the realm of human rights when our great constitutional tradition has
already cleared a well-worn path"); see also Inupiat Cmty. v. United States, 746 F.2d
570, 571-72 (9th Cir. 1984) (in a case involving a Native American community's
attempts to use the Covenant to enjoin oil development in Alaska, holding that,
"[a]ssuming these international understandings are applicable, appellants point to no
provision... that could be interpreted as imposing upon the United States a greater
obligation to protect the subsistence culture of the Natives than that imposed upon the
United States by federal domestic law .... ); Crow v. Gullet, 706 F.2d 856, 858 (8th Cir.
1983) (in a case involving allegations that state officials were improperly restricting
access to traditional Native American religious ceremonial grounds, holding that, "even
assuming that.., the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights applied to the
state in this case, these provisions did not establish any legal rights or causes of action
beyond those recognized under the first amendment"). Both of these cases are of
[Vol. 26
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shows why the Ralk court and others that have similarly limited
the Covenant's reach to those matters already covered by the
United States Constitution have misinterpreted the requirements of
the Covenant.63
Since United States courts do not truly interpret the
International Covenant, but rather simply assume its provisions
extend no further than those rights already protected by the United
States Constitution, attorneys have an incentive to bring suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, an area of well-established precedent, whenever
possible.64 The result of this phenomenon is that the International
particular interest to me in light of the argument I make, infra at note 166, for extending
the coverage of the Alien Tort Claims Act to include Native Americans. Specifically, I
propose that the International Covenant be applied when an ATCA claim is available, to
Native Americans.
At the same time, however, at least one recent district court opinion acknowledges
that the International Covenant may impose obligations beyond those already imposed
by domestic law. See Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206, 232 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)
("[T]he ICCPR prevents a nation from separating families in a manner that, while in
accordance with its domestic law, is nonetheless unreasonable and in conflict with the
underlying provisions of the ICCPR.") (emphasis added). I am hopeful that other courts
will follow the lead of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York.
63 One source of the courts' frequent misunderstanding of the International
Covenant may be unfamiliarity with the requirements of the Covenant. Indeed, the
United Nations Human Rights Committee has raised this ignorance as a concern. See
Comments on United States of America, U.N. GADR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess.,
1413th mtg., 115, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.50, (1995) ("The Committee regrets that
members of the Judiciary both at the federal, state and local levels have not been fully
made aware of the obligations undertaken by the State party under the Covenant, and
that judicial continuing education programmes do not include knowledge of the
Covenant and discussion or its implementation.").
64 Of the twenty-seven International Covenant cases I studied, only six were
decided in favor of the plaintiff on International Covenant grounds. Interestingly, most of
these cases (twenty-three) were brought against United States defendants; only three of
these, however, compared with three of the four cases brought against foreign
defendants, were decided in favor of the plaintiff on International Covenant grounds. See
Appendix for one way in which the cases may be organized for analysis. As the
Appendix shows, even though more cases have been brought against United States
defendants than against foreign defendants under the International Covenant, the chances
of success appear appreciably higher for claims against foreign defendants. These
statistics seem to demonstrate United States courts' uneasiness in applying the
International Covenant to United States citizens, particularly when the claims involve
action by the United States government. But cf. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885
(2d Cir. 1980) ("[I]nternational law confers fundamental rights upon all people vis-a-vis
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Covenant is not effectively providing the protections it intended; a
§ 1983 claim does not result in protection equal to that of the
International Covenant, if the Covenant is fully implemented. Two
areas in which this failing is particularly obvious are the respective
state action requirements of both § 1983 and the International
Covenant, and those areas in which the International Covenant
protects rights not expressly recognized in the Constitution.
A. State Action
To establish a violation of rights protected under customary
international law including, but not limited to, the International
Covenant, it is not always necessary to prove that a state actor was
involved in the conduct giving rise to the litigation. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addresses precisely
this issue in the recent case of Kadic v. Karadzic.6" In Kadic, the
court holds that "[w]e do not agree that the law of nations, as
understood in the modern era, confines its reach to state action.
Instead, we hold that certain forms of conduct violate the law of
nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a
state or only as private individuals."66 Kadic and several other
recent cases that have held similarly stem from the frequently cited
concurring opinion of Judge Harry T. Edwards in Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, in which he states that there are a "handful
of crimes to which the law of nations attributes individual
their own governments.").
65 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
66 Id. at 239. The Kadic court notes that piracy, slave trade, genocide, and certain
war crimes are actionable when they are committed by individuals. See id. at 239-40
(citations omitted); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES, supra note 44, Vol. 1, pt. II, Introductory Note ("Individuals may be
held liable for offenses against international law, such as piracy, war crimes, or
genocide."); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 891-92 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding
that forced labor, also known as slave trading, is actionable when done by private
actors); Nat'l Coalition Gov't v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 348-49 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
(same holding); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 371 n.5 (E.D. La.
1997) (citing Kadic, 70 F.3d at 244, for the proposition that genocide may be found
without proof of state action); Jama v. United States Immigration and Naturalization
Serv., 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 362 (D.N.J. 1998) (citing Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239-40, for the
proposition that, "[d]epending on the nature of the offense, an ATCA claim may be
brought against private individuals as well as state actors").
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responsibility."67 Although Judge Edwards names only the crimes
of slavery and piracy," the recent opinion of the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey speaks more broadly
on the subject, stating that "[n]o logical reason exists for allowing
private individuals and corporations to escape liability for
universally condemned violations of international law merely
because they were not acting under color of law."69
By far the most expansive list of international law violations
for which no state action is required is suggested in the recent case
of Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front." In that case, the court holds
that "crimes against humanity, war crimes, hijacking, summary
execution, rape, mutilation, sexual slavery, murder," piracy, slave
trade, kidnapping, and cruel treatment and torture are all
"proscribed by international law against both state and private
actors."7' The court bases its holding on both the broad language of
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, which addresses
many of these acts, and the Kadic court's holding that "'offenses
of universal concern' [are] capable of being committed by private
actors."" In summary, although it remains unclear exactly which
violations of international law may be alleged against both private
and state actors, it is uncontroversial that some such subset of
violations exists. It is equally uncontroversial that, when the same
facts are alleged that might have supported any item in this subset,
a plaintiff who brings suit under § 1983 will lose if she is unable to
prove state action."
B. Constitutional Gaps
Despite the many exceptions the Senate attached to the
ratification of the International Covenant by the United States, the
67 726 F.2d 774, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring).
68 See id. at 794.
69 Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 445 (D.N.J. 1999). Despite its
broad rhetoric, however, the court ultimately decides the case on more conventional
grounds, finding that the plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate state action.
70 993 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1998) (citations omitted).
71 Id. at 5, 7-8.
72 Id. at 7 (citing Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240).
71 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
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Covenant requires more comprehensive protection for some
human rights than is required by the text of the United States
Constitution.74 The following are some of the areas in which the
International Covenant protects rights not expressly recognized by
the Constitution:
"The Covenant protects ethnic and linguistic minorities,
including the right of the latter to use their own language. The
U.S. Constitution is silent."75
"The Covenant protects the right of privacy in the family, home,
or correspondence. The U.S. Constitution is silent except with
respect to the home."76
"The Covenant prohibits medical or scientific experimentation
without consent by the subject. The U.S. Constitution is silent."77
"The Covenant requires that a defendant must be informed [of
his legal rights and the charges against him] in a language which
he understands and have free assistance of an interpreter in
court. The U.S. Constitution is silent. 78
74 I differentiate between the text of the United States Constitution and the
interpretative case law that has emerged surrounding the Constitution. Like Neier, I
believe the Covenant's express recognition of many rights currently protected in the
United States only by judicial decisions interpreting the Constitution provides an
important additional measure of security for those rights that are not yet so firmly
established as to be virtually unabrogable. See Neier, supra note 56, at 1236-37 (1993).
75 Neier, supra note 56, at 1237 (footnote omitted). Neier's point is that there are
rights recognized in the United States but not protected by the express language of the
Constitution. He argues that, to the extent these protections are available, "it is as a
consequence ofjudicial decisions interpreting the U.S. Constitution or as a result of state
constitutional or federal and state statutory provisions." Id. Neier believes that, even as a
non-self-executing treaty, the International Covenant is valuable because it expressly
recognizes these and the other rights discussed in this section. See id. He believes that
courts are likely, over time, to "shap[e] their decisions to conform to international
standards to which the United States has now proclaimed its adherence." Id. I have
omitted many of Neier's examples that pertain to matters (such as the prohibition against
sex discrimination) that, while not recognized in the express language of the
Constitution, are nevertheless sufficiently well-established by interpretive case law that
their abrogation by subsequent courts seems extremely unlikely. Indeed, Neier
acknowledges this point. See id. at 1238 (noting that "it seems unlikely that the courts
will turn their backs on the line of judicial decisions of the past two decades that prohibit
sex discrimination").
76 Id. at 1237 (footnote omitted).
17 Id. (footnote omitted).
78 Id. at 1238 (footnote omitted).
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"The Covenant requires equality of the rights of spouses [as to
decisions made regarding the marriage.] The U.S. Constitution
is silent.,
79
"The Covenant requires the availability of commutation of a
death sentence. The U.S. Constitution is silent except with
regard to federal offenses."8
"The Covenant ... take[s] a more expansive view than U.S. law
on the presumption of [a criminal defendant's] innocence [with
regard to affirmative defenses]"8
The International Covenant "prohibit[s] ... the execution of
pregnant women, [while] sixteen states in this country still have
laws which would permit such executions."82
Because a number of gaps exist between the International
Covenant and United States domestic law, the assumption of the
courts that the two are equivalent results in the courts' effectively
both writing out, as the Ralk court did, those portions of the
International Covenant that protect rights not expressly recognized
in the United States Constitution and their relying totally on
interpretive case law to protect those rights.
IV. Pursuing an International Covenant Claim in Light of the
Non-Self-Executing Exception
I have examined below four different means of bringing a
successful International Covenant claim in light of the non-self-
79 Id. (footnote omitted).
80 Id. (footnote omitted).
81 John Quigley, Criminal Law and Human Rights: Implications of the United
States Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 6 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 59, 65 (1993). Quigley notes that current law in the United States, in both
federal and state jurisdictions, deviates from the firm rule that in no case shall the
accused shoulder the burden to prove an asserted defense. Id. at 66. He states that, "in
federal courts, the accused must prove the elements of the insanity defense and, in
certain state jurisdictions, the elements of various defenses" such as duress, intoxication,
and insanity. Id. at 66-67 (footnotes omitted). Quigley notes that the Covenant's text on
this provision has yet to be interpreted fully, but further notes that, "[iln the
interpretation of 'presumption of innocence' that prevailed among other parties to the
Covenant, the burden of proof for affirmative defenses rests on the prosecution .... I d.
at 68 (footnote omitted).
82 Posner & Spiro, supra note 56, at 1215 (footnote omitted). Posner and Spiro
note, however, that "in practice, no state has executed a pregnant woman." Id.
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executing declaration, ordering the arguments from least
persuasive to most persuasive. Previous scholars have presented
the first three arguments, while the last is my own argument,
originally inspired by the opinion of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Abebe-Jiri v. Negewo 83 and
now affirmed by the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Georgia in Ralk v. Lincoln County.84 First, some
scholars argue that the Senate's Declaration was ultra vires.85
Second, others attempt to show that the Declaration, while not
ultra vires, is without legal effect because, a declaration unlike a
reservation is not part of the treaty and therefore should not bind
the courts.86 Third and fourth are arguments for using the Alien
Tort Claims Act in one of two ways to provide a cause of action
under the International Covenant: (1) under the Act's customary
international law prong,87 or (2) under the Act's treaty prong.8" The
two prongs of the ATCA, taken together, constitute the best
approach to International Covenant claims available under current
law.
A. Claiming the Senate's Declaration Is Ultra Vires
One way to avoid the non-self-executing declaration is to
argue, first, that the Senate had no power to declare the treaty non-
self-executing (as this declaration is within the proper realm of the
Judiciary, rather than the Legislature) and, second, that the
International Covenant is the type of treaty courts traditionally
have found to be self-executing. As is discussed below, this
argument enjoys some popularity among scholars but has not
found support in existing United States case law. The difficulty
with this theory is that the President, as the treaty-maker for the
83 72 F.3d 844 (11 th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 830 (1996).
84 81 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. Ga. 2000).
85 See discussion infra Part IV (A), Claiming the Senate's Declaration is Ultra
Vires.
86 See discussion infra Part IV (B), Claiming the Senate Declaration is of No
Effect.
87 See discussion infra Part IV (C) (1), Using the ATCA to Bring Suit Under
Customary International Law.
88 See discussion infra Part IV (C) (2), Using the ATCA to Provide Enabling
Legislation for the International Covenant.
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nation, has the authority to negotiate the terms of a treaty.89 In
addition, the Senate, as part of the advice and consent process, has
the authority to condition its consent upon exceptions such as the
non-self-executing declaration." The President may then either
accept or reject the conditions upon which the Senate has
predicated its consent.9' Once the treaty has been ratified, courts
have the authority to determine whether the treaty is to be deemed
self-executing.92 In doing so, however, the courts give controlling
weight to expressions of the treaty-maker's intent, such as a non-
self-executing declaration.93
In The Rule of Non-Inquiry and Human Rights Treaties,
Professor John Quigley states that, "[u]nder established precedent,
the courts, rather than the Senate, decide whether a treaty
provision is self-executing."94 He goes on to state that "U.S. courts
routinely hold rights provisions in treaties to be self-executing."9
Despite Professor Quigley's support of this theory, none of the
treaties involved in the cases he cites in support of these two
statements contains a declaration that it is to be deemed non-self-
executing. Professor Quigley acknowledges that the current
Restatement runs counter to his theory, but he maintains that the
Restatement view is unjustified:
[T]he Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
89 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 496
(Johnny H. Killian ed., 1987).
90 See id. at 496.
9' See id.
92 See id. at 496-98; see also Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1892)
("Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be
regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of legislature, whenever it operates of
itself without the aid of any legislative provision."), overruled in part on other grounds
by United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
93 See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION,
supra note 89, at 496; Foster, 27 U.S. at 314.
94 Quigley, supra note 39, at 1231 (citing Foster, 27 U.S. at 314; Frolova v. Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1985) (involving the United
Nations Charter)).
95 Quigley, supra note 39, at 1236 (citing United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591
F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir. 1979) (involving the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations);
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407,427-29 (1886) (involving the extradition treaty
between the United States and Great Britain)).
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States maintains that a Senate reservation or understanding of
non-self execution binds the courts.96 . . . The Restatement view
might seem justified based on the rationale that a greater power
includes a lesser power. The Constitution, however, in giving
the Senate the power of consent to treaties, did not contemplate
any power of imposing a condition. The Constitution granted the
President the power to negotiate treaties, and the Senate the
power to give advice and to grant (or withhold) consent. The
import of this provision is that the Senate may make suggestions
to the President (the advice function) and then may say "yea" or
"nay" to the treaty (the consent function). While a President who
ignores the Senate's advice runs the risk that the Senate may
withhold consent, the Constitution does not contemplate a power
in the Senate to impose terms not contained in the treaty as
negotiated by the President. The Senate enjoys a veto power, not
a power of revision.9
96 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States provides
in relevant part as follows, with regard to non-self-executing treaties:
Courts in the United States are bound to give effect to international law and to
international agreements of the United States, except that a "non-self-executing"
agreement will not be given effect as law in the absence of necessary
implementation. An international agreement of the United States is "non-self-
executing" if the agreement manifests an intention that it shall not become
effective as domestic law without the enactment of implementing legislation, if
the Senate in giving consent to a treaty, or Congress by resolution, requires
implementing legislation, or if implementing legislation is constitutionally
required.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 111
(1987); see also id. at § I 11, cmt. c ("Some international agreements of the United States
are non-self-executing and will not be applied as law by the courts until they are
implemented by necessary legislation."). Comment d to § 303 provides as follows:
The Senate often has given its consent subject to conditions. Sometimes the
Senate consents only on the basis of a particular understanding of the meaning
of the treaty, or on condition that the United States obtain a modification of its
terms or enter a reservation to it... The Senate may also give its consent on
conditions that do not require change in the treaty but relate to its domestic
application, e.g., that the treaty shall not be self-executing... ; or that
agreements or appointments made in implementation of the treaty shall require
the Senate's advice and consent.
Id. at § 303 comment d (citations omitted).
97 Quigley, supra note 39, at 1233 (footnote omitted); see also Quigley, supra note
81, at 63-64. Professor Quigley states as follows:
The Senate declaration has uncertain legal status. It is neither an Act of
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Congress, having the force of federal law, nor a reservation to the Covenant,
having all the authority of treaty law under the Supremacy Clause. The
declaration has effect only insofar as it bears upon a judicial appraisal of the
Covenant's force. This appraisal is not a fait accompli; it is not clear how much
weight the Senate's declaration will carry with the courts.
Quigley, supra note 81, at 63-64 (footnotes omitted). Accord Quigley, supra note 17, at
1298. Professor Quigley makes the following argument:
The Senate, by including this "declaration" on non-self-execution, has
implicitly asserted a power to determine that treaty provisions are not self-
executing. However, this is a function normally exercised by the courts, which
decide whether a particular treaty, or a particular treaty provision, is one that
grants rights enforceable before the court.
Quigley, supra note 17, at 1298. It is possible to make a corollary argument that the non-
self-executing declaration is the sort of declaration that the United Nations has indicated
is invalid. The United Nations Human Rights Committee has demonstrated, through its
statements on point, that it does not consider all reservations and declarations to be valid.
See General Comment Adopted Under Article 40 On Issues Relating to Reservations
Made Upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant on the Optional Protocols, or in
Relation to Declarations Under Article 41 of the Covenant, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts.
Comm., 52d. Sess., 1382d mtg., IN 9, 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.6 (1994),
reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 839, 842-43:
[A] State [may not] reserve an entitlement not to take the necessary steps at the
domestic level to give effect to the rights of the Covenant .... The Covenant
consists notjust of the specified rights, but of important supportive guarantees.
These guarantees provide the necessary framework for securing the rights in the
Covenant and are thus essential to its object and purpose. Some operate at the
national level and some at the international level. Reservations designed to
remove these guarantees are thus not acceptable .... Guarantees such as these
are an integral part of the structure of the Covenant and underpin its efficacy.
Id. To the extent that the Declaration "reserve(s] an entitlement not to take the necessary
steps at the domestic level to give effect to the rights of the Covenant," it would
therefore be invalid. Id. In addition, a strong argument could be made that providing
implementation of the Covenant is "an important supportive guarantee[]," operating at
the national level and thus "essential to its structure and purpose" and not subject to
derogation. Id.
Indeed, it is possible to take this argument even further, claiming that no exceptions
to the International Covenant are appropriate. See William A. Schabas, Invalid
Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is the United
States Still a Party? 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 277, 291 (1995) (stating that "[a]n argument
can be made that all of the Covenant's substantive provisions are essential to its 'object
and purpose,' and that, as a consequence, reservation to any provision is illegal").
Although the exception with which this article is concerned is a declaration, rather than a
reservation, similar reasoning should hold in this context. In addition, should the
declaration be proven to operate as a reservation, it will be interpreted as such. See infra
note 110.
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Professor Quigley's viewpoint is echoed by Professors Stefan
Riesenfeld and Frederick Abbott:
We believe that the Senate lacks the constitutional authority to
declare the non-self-executing character of a treaty with binding
effect on U.S. courts. The Senate has the unicameral power only
to consent to the ratification of treaties, not to pass domestic
legislation. A declaration is not part of a treaty in the sense of
modifying the legal obligations created by it. A declaration is
merely an expression of an interpretation or of a policy or
position. U.S. courts are bound by the Constitution to apply
treaties as the law of the land. They are not bound to apply
expressions of opinion adopted by the Senate (and concurred in
by the President). The courts must undertake their own
examination of the terms and context of each provision in a
treaty to which the United States is a party and decide whether it
is self-executing. The treaty is law. The Senate's declaration is
not law. The Senate does not have the power to make law
outside the treaty instrument.98
Despite these early predictions just after the ratification of the
International Covenant, the Senate Declaration carries controlling
weight with the courts. Such weighting is the correct result in that,
contrary to the assertions of Quigley, Riesenfeld, and Abbott, the
United States Senate has the power to condition its consent to a
treaty upon the entry of exceptions to the treaty.99 The President
and the Senate work together in the treaty-making process, each
having a separate role.' ° Although only the President negotiates
the treaty, the Senate has several options in performing its function
98 Foreword: Symposium on Parliamentary Participation in the Making and
Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 293, 296-97 (1991).
99 See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND
INTERPRETATION, supra note 89, at 496 (analyzing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2); see
also Power Auth. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 247 F.2d 538, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1957)
("Unquestionably the Senate may condition its consent to a treaty upon a variation of its
terms."); Recent Case, Power Authority v. F.P.C., 71 HARV. L. REV. 368, 369 (1957)
("Article II of the Constitution provides that the Senate must advise and consent to the
making of treaties by the President, but says nothing about reservations. It has always
been assumed, however, that the Senate may give its consent subject to such conditions
as it may attach.") (footnote omitted).
100 See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND
INTERPRETATION, supra note 89, at 496.
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of providing advice and consent.'"' The Senate may give its
unconditional consent to a proposed treaty, it may refuse consent,
or it may condition its consent upon the entry of one or more
exceptions to the treaty. 0 2 The President may, in turn, accept any
conditions the Senate requires or may abandon the negotiations. 3
Aside from my disagreement with the first part of Professor
Quigley's argument, if a court found the Senate's Declaration to
be ultra vires, the court would then need to determine whether the
International Covenant is the type of treaty that courts consistently
find to be self-executing. The Ninth Circuit has developed a four-
part test, now employed nationwide, that considers the following
factors in determining whether a treaty is self-executing:
the purposes of the treaty and the objectives of its creators;
the existence of domestic procedures and institutions appropriate
for direct implementation;
the availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement
methods; and
the immediate and long-range social consequences of self or
non-self-execution, I4
"[I]n applying this test, the Ninth Circuit has found 'that it is
the first factor that is critical to determine whether an executive
agreement (or treaty) is self-executing, while the other factors are
most relevant to determine the extent to which the agreement is
self-executing."" 5
Each court that has considered the Saipan test in the
International Covenant context has determined that the United




104 People of Saipan v. United States Dept. of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 97 (9th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975), quoted in Islamic Republic of Iran v. Boeing
Co., 771 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1985).
105 Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1257 (C.D. Cal. 1999)
(quoting Islamic Republic of Iran, 771 F.2d at 1283); see also Calderon v. Reno, 39 F.
Supp. 2d 943, 956 (N.D. I1l. 1998) ("Whether a treaty is self-executing is an issue for
judicial interpretation .... and courts will consider several factors in discerning the intent
of the parties to the agreement .... However, if the parties' intent is clear from the
treaty's language, courts will not inquire into the remaining factors.") (citations omitted).
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intent, controls the issue and precludes further analysis. This
assumption seems to follow logically from the fact that the
President, the treaty-maker for the nation, acquiesced in the
Declaration, such that it seems appropriate to assume that the
Declaration reflects his intention that the treaty be non-self-
executing. Whether, however, the President, declared by the
Constitution to be the "treaty-maker" for the nation, is also
properly to be considered the "creator" of the treaty for the
purposes of analyzing the treaty under the terms provided in
Saipan, is beyond the scope of this article.' 6
Professor Quigley argues that, under the Saipan test, courts
should deem the International Covenant self-executing:
First, the obvious purpose of a treaty provision granting a
particular human right is that the contracting parties afford all
persons that right. Second, certain domestic procedures and
institutions are appropriate for direct implementation-namely,
the courts. Third, methods of enforcement other than domestic
courts are weak. Fourth, the immediate and long-range social
consequences of non-self-execution are serious because the
individuals may be subjected to onerous deprivations of rights.0°
106 Assuming, for the purposes of argument, that the United Nations, rather than the
President of the United States, could be deemed the "creator" of the treaty for Saipan
purposes, one could use the following language from United States v. Benitez, 28 F.
Supp. 2d 1361, 1363 (S.D. Fla. 1998), to argue that the United Nations intended the
treaty to be self-executing:
The intent of the ICCPR is to provide international protection for the civil and
political rights of the individual, as well as economic, social, and cultural
rights.... By its language, the ICCPR does not purport to regulate affairs
between nations. Rather, the ICCPR is an international agreement prescribing
how each state party is to treat individuals within its jurisdiction .... In
addition .... the Human Rights Committee... states that the ICCPR is not a
mere exchange of obligations between states, but rather, a human rights treaty
which is "for the benefit of persons within their jurisdiction." ... The
Committee Comment further declares, "The intention of the Covenant is that the
rights contained therein should be ensured to all those under a State's [sic]
party's jurisdiction."
Id. at 1363-64. The Benitez court clearly found the intent of the United Nations was to
create rights that would be enforceable by individuals. This analysis is supported by
several recent United Nations pronouncements suggesting that the U.N. may have
intended all international human rights treaties to be self-executing. See supra note 97.
107 Quigley, supra note 39, at 1236-37; see also Quigley, supra note 17, at 1301.
Professor Quigley further argues as follows:
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The difficulty with this argument, as indicated above, is that
the Saipan test directs courts to consider the intent of the treaty-
maker as controlling.' 8 With regard to the International Covenant,
it seems clear that the President, as the treaty-maker for the nation,
intended that the treaty be non-self-executing. Thus, it seems
unlikely that a court will accept the argument that the Senate's
declaration is ultra vires.
B. Claiming the Senate Declaration is of No Effect
A second possible approach to avoiding the non-self-executing
declaration is to argue that the Senate's act, while not ultra vires, is
nevertheless without legal effect because the Declaration is not
part of the treaty and therefore should not bind the courts. Those
scholars presenting this argument assert that this approach is
consistent with the reasoning of Power Authority v. Federal Power
Commission,"'9 a case in which the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit holds that a Senate reservation
to a treaty operates as a declaration, despite its label, and is
therefore without legal effect insofar as the exception purports to
modify the United States' international obligations. Importantly,
the Power Authority case involves a reservation, rather than a
declaration. As is discussed below, because Senate mislabeled the
non-self-executing exception to the International Covenant a
declaration, rather than a reservation, reasoning such as that
presented by the Power Authority court actually militates against
the conclusion that the exception is of no effect."'
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights falls into the category
of treaties that the courts have called "self-executing." The parties clearly intend
that the various rights guaranteed should inure to the benefit of individual
persons. That, to be sure, is the only reason for a treaty on human rights. A
human rights treaty confers rights on individuals. It is not merely a promise by
States to promote rights, but a promise to protect rights in the concrete, in any
situation where they are jeopardized.
Quigley, supra note 17, at 1301.
101 See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
109 See, e.g., Quigley, supra note 39, at 1232 (citing Power Auth. v. Fed. Power
Comm'n., 247 F.2d 538, 540 (D.C. Cir. 1957), vacated as moot, Am. Pub. Power Ass'n
v. Power Auth., 355 U.S. 64 (1957)).
10 It is important to note that the parties' description of a given provision as a
reservation or a declaration will not be controlling. See Richard D. Glick, Environmental
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The Power Authority case concerns a reservation to the 1950
treaty between the United States and Canada regarding Niagara
Falls."' Under the reservation in question, the United States retains
the right to enact domestic legislation in the future concerning the
disposition of the water on the United States' side of the Falls."2
As an initial matter, the Power Authority court holds as
follows:
The parties agree that, if the reservation to the 1950 treaty is not
"Law of the Land," the [lower court] order should be set aside.
Since the reservation did not have the concurrence of the House
of Representatives, it is not "Law of the Land" by way of
legislation. The question is whether it became "Law of the
Justice in the United States: Implications of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 69, 101-02 n.152 (1995) ("The
characterization of a given statement as a reservation, declaration, or understanding is
not important; a statement will be considered as a 'reservation' if it purports to function
as one.") (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 44, at § 313, cmt. g). Comment g provides as
follows:
When signing or adhering to an international agreement, a state may make a
unilateral declaration that does not purport to be a reservation. Whatever it is
called, it constitutes a reservation in fact if it purports to exclude, limit, or
modify the state's legal obligation. Sometimes, however, a declaration
purports to be an "understanding," an interpretation of the agreement in a
particular respect. Such an interpretive declaration is not a reservation if it
reflects the accepted view of the agreement. But another contracting party
may challenge the expressed understanding, treating it as a reservation which
it is not prepared to accept.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 44, at § 313, cmt. g. See also General Comment Adopted
Under Article 40 On Issues Relating to Reservations Made Upon Ratification or
Accession to the Covenant on the Optional Protocols, or in Relation to Declarations
Under Article 41 of the Covenant, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 52d Sess., 1382d
mtg., 3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.6 (1994), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. at 841.
It is not always easy to distinguish a reservation from a declaration as to a
State's understanding of the interpretation of a provision, or from a statement
of policy. Regard will be had to the intention of the State, rather than the form
of the instrument. If a statement, irrespective of its name or title, purports to
exclude or modify the legal effect of a treaty in its application to the State, it
constitutes a reservation. Conversely, if a so-called reservation merely offers a
State's understanding of a provision but does not exclude or modify that
provision in its application to that State, it is, in reality, not a reservation.
Id. (footnote omitted).
IIl See generally Power Auth., 247 F.2d at 540.
112 See id.
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Land" as part of the treaty.113
In finding that the reservation was not "Law of the Land," the
court rejects the following argument:
[T]he reservation is an effective part of the treaty because (1) it
was a condition of the Senate's consent to the ratification of the
treaty; (2) the condition was sanctioned by the President, was
"accepted" by Canada, and was included in the exchange of
ratifications; and (3) it "thus became a part of the Treaty."' 4
In rejecting this argument, the court holds as follows:
[T]he reservation... made no change in the treaty. It was
merely an expression of domestic policy which the Senate
attached to its consent. It was not a counter-offer requiring
Canadian acceptance before the treaty could become effective.
That Canada did "accept" the reservation does not change its
character. The Canadian acceptance, moreover, was not so much
an acceptance as a disclaimer of interest. It is of some
significance in this regard that the Canadian Government,
although it had submitted the original treaty to the Parliament
for its approval, found it unnecessary to resubmit the treaty to
Parliament after the reservation was inserted. Also significant is
the fact that the President ratified the treaty with the reservation
without even waiting for Canada to "accept.""'
In contrast, the court holds, "A true reservation which becomes a
part of a treaty is one which alters 'the effect of the treaty in so far
as it may apply in the relations of the State with the other State or
States which may be parties to the treaty.""' 6 Applying the
reasoning of the Power Authority Court to the International
Covenant, the Senate should have labeled the non-self-executing
exception a reservation, rather than a declaration.' 7 From this
II3 See id.
114 Id.
"15 Id. at 541.
116 Id. (citation omitted).
"7 Other scholars similarly question the Senate's labeling of the various exceptions
it imposed on the International Covenant. See Bassiouni, supra note 18, at 1174-75.
If the Senate intended all of these labels to be deemed equivalent to
"reservations," why did it use other terms? Could it be that the Senate's intent
has been to create purposeful confusion between international legal obligations
and national implementation? How will judges acting pursuant to Article VI of
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point, applying the holding of the Power Authority court to the
non-self-executing exception actually results in the finding that the
exception is effective. A declaration, by definition, does not
modify the international obligations of a State but merely
expresses the State's own domestic policy. To understand why the
non-self-executing exception modifies the obligations of the
United States under international law and must therefore be
the Constitution be bound by such language, if at all? The ICCPR will surely be
the subject of litigation in U.S. courts. In that event, how will courts interpret
these different labels and their contents? The "cluttering" of treaties promotes
neither legislative clarity nor judicial economy.
[I]n the case of treaties whose import is to create national legal rights, the
dichotomy between the international and domestic legal significance of a
"reservation" or the like becomes more troublesome. In Article 2, the ICCPR
establishes certain legal and administrative obligations by conferring on
individuals certain legal and administrative rights. How can these rights be
internationally binding yet nationally unenforceable? Unfortunately, the
Senate's reservations, understandings, and provisos attached to the ICCPR
create this precise result.
Bassiouni, supra note 18, at 1174-75. Accord Quigley, supra note 40, at 1102.
Under the Covenant, the Senate's declaration on self-execution does implicate
the rights of other states parties. Under Article 2, they have a right to expect that
the United States will permit domestic enforcement of Covenant-guaranteed
rights. If the United States fails to do that, the rights of the other states parties
are violated. This fact makes the Senate's declaration on self-execution of the
Covenant closer to a reservation than was true of the Senate statement regarding
electrical power under the U.S.-Canada treaty.
Quigley, supra note 40, at 1102 (footnote omitted); see also Glick, supra note 110, at
106 n.172.
The Netherlands entered a statement declaring that the understandings and
declarations of the United States [to the International Covenant] were not
reservations, do not modify the obligations of the United States, and do not limit
the competence of the Human Rights Committee to apply its interpretation of
Articles 2(1) and 26 [of the Covenant] to the United States .... States who want
to enter reservations should be forced to call them reservations and not be
allowed the political benefit of disguising them as understandings.
Glick, supra note 110, at 106 n.172 (citation omitted). But see Comments on United
States of America, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., 1413th mtg., q 12, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.50 (1995) ("The Committee... notes with satisfaction the
assurances of the government that its declaration regarding the federal system is not a
reservation and is not intended to affect the international obligations of the United
States.").
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considered a reservation,18 rather than a declaration, consider the
following: in ratifying the International Covenant, the United
States made certain specific promises to the international
community, arguably including the promise to provide a neutral
forum for the resolution of disputes arising under the International
Covenant."9 When a foreign citizen seeks to bring suit under the
118 For the purposes of this argument, I put aside the fact that, if the non-self-
executing exception is a reservation, rather than a declaration, then it was not made in
accordance with the appropriate procedure and may therefore be ineffective for that
reason. Importantly, however, even if the exception is deemed ineffective as a
reservation, the United States remains bound by the International Covenant. See Quigley,
supra note 17, at 1302 ("International law follows a rule comparable to the ultra vires
rule in corporation law to protect other States Parties. Under this rule, a state is bound by
a treaty despite an internal defect in the process leading to its adherence, unless the
defect was obvious and fundamental."); see also Power Auth., 247 F.2d at 543-44
(citations omitted).
It is argued that, since the reservation was a condition to the Senate's consent to
the treaty, to deny effect to the condition vitiates the consent and thus
invalidates the whole treaty. That argument, we think, was disposed of by the
Supreme Court in New York Indians v. United States, 170 U.S. 1, 18 (1898)....
That case involved a treaty with certain Indian tribes. The Senate in its
resolution of consent to the treaty, had attached certain amendments and
declared that "the treaty shall have no force or effect whatever .... nor shall it
be understood that the senate have assented to any of the contracts connected
with it until the same, with the amendments herein proposed, is submitted and
fully and fairly explained by a commissioner of the United States to each of said
tribes or bands, separately assembled in council, and they have given their free
and voluntary assent thereto."... The amendments which the Senate attached
to its resolution consenting to the treaty, as the Supreme Court recognized, were
not communicated to the Indian tribes. The Court concluded that the
amendments were not part of the treaty. It nevertheless treated the Senate's
consent as effective to make the treaty valid and operative.
Power Auth., 247 F.2d at 543-44 (citations omitted).
119 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 9, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368, 369, which provides as follows:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized
are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the
violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right
thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative, or legislative
authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal
system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
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International Covenant in a United States court against a proper
defendant over whom the court has personal jurisdiction and the
court invokes the non-self-executing exception to prevent her from
doing so, the so-called Declaration affects the United States'
performance of its international obligations, just as a declaration is
definitionally unable to do.
I conclude that reasoning such as that presented by the Power
Authority court actually leads to the opposite result than that for
which it is normally cited in this context. The Power Authority
holding, properly applied, supports the conclusion that the non-
self-executing exception is a reservation, rather than a declaration
and, as such, must be given legal effect.
C. Using the Alien Tort Claims Act
When the plaintiff is not a United States citizen, the Alien Tort
Claims Act may be used one of two ways, consistent with the non-
self-executing declaration, to bring suit under the International
Covenant. First, the Act may be used to bring suit for a violation
of customary international law.'2° Second, the ATCA may be used
to bring suit for a treaty violation.'2 The first approach is presented
by other scholars.'22 Although I believe it to be a flawed argument,
this approach remains the best available option for alien plaintiffs
to bring suit against alien defendants in United States Courts.
Notwithstanding the availability of this approach, I argue that the
second approach is preferable to allow alien plaintiffs to sue
United States defendants.
The Alien Tort Claims Act provides as follows: "The district
To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when
granted.
Id.
120 See discussion infra Part IV (C) (1), Using the ATCA to Bring Suit Under
Customary International Law.
121 See discussion infra Part IV (C) (2), Using the ATCA to Provide Enabling
Legislation for the International Covenant.
122 See Anthony D'Amato, Judge Bork's Concept of the Law of Nations is Seriously
Mistaken, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 92, 100-01 (1985); Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy
Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretative Role of International
Law, 86 GEO. L. J. 479, 509-13 (1998); Richard B. Lillich, Invoking International
Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 393-408 (1985).
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courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States." '23 It is not necessary for the
plaintiff to show that relief is unavailable under domestic law to
proceed under the ATCA. 124 It is common, for instance, to plead
under both 42 U.S.C. §1983 and the International Covenant
(through the ATCA) in a single case, when both are available.
In addition, the majority view is as follows:
[I]t is unnecessary that plaintiffs establish the existence of an
independent, express right of action [to invoke the ATCA], since
the law of nations clearly does not create or define civil actions,
and to require such an explicit grant under international law
would effectively nullify that portion of the statute which
confers jurisdiction over tort suits involving the law of
nations.... Rather, a plaintiff seeking to predicate jurisdiction
on the Alien Tort Statute need only plead a "tort ... in violation
of the law of nations.' 25
123 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994). Note that "[t]he language employed by the ATCA, 'a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations,' has no clearly recognized
definition in modern law." BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 50 (1996).
124 See Jama v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 22 F. Supp. 2d
353, 364 (D.N.J. 1998) ("There is nothing in the ATCA which limits its application to
situations where there is no relief available under domestic law.").
125 Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1539 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (citation
omitted). There remains, however, a split of authority among the United States Circuit
Courts of Appeals as to whether a private cause of action exists under the ATCA.
Indeed, each of the cases standing for the proposition that no private cause of action
exists under the International Covenant comes from a circuit in which the availability of
a private cause of action under the ATCA either has been rejected or has not been
addressed at the Circuit Court of Appeals level. See, e.g., Igartua de la Rosa v. United
States, 32 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1994); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774
(D.D.C. 1984); White v. Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380 (E.D. Wash. 1998).
The Igartua de la Rosa decision, for example, stands for the proposition that an
individual may not bring suit under the International Covenant. See 32 F.3d at 10. The
opinion does not, however, address whether an International Covenant claim might be
brought under the ATCA. Indeed, I have been able to identify no case from the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit addressing the existence of a private right of
action under the ATCA. The United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts, however, has not only found a private right of action under the ATCA,
but has also allowed an individual to recover civil damages under the ATCA for
violations of the Covenant. See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 179, 184-85 (D.
Mass. 1995) (awarding compensatory and punitive damages for torture and arbitrary
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An area of considerable confusion is the extent to which the status
of the United States as a party to a given treaty should be relevant
to claims brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act. The treaty
prong of the ATCA should be employed only in an action against
a United States defendant, as the treaty prong applies only to "a
treaty of the United States," and whether the United States is a
party to any given treaty has no apparent relevance to an action
brought against a foreign actor for action that occurred outside the
United States.' 26 Conversely, when the treaty prong of the ATCA is
employed in an action against a United States defendant, it is
appropriate to consider whether the United States is a party to the
treaty under which the action is being brought.
Likewise, it is appropriate to bring suit against a foreign actor
for action occurring abroad only under the customary international
law prong of the ATCA. When an action is brought under this
second prong of the Act, whether the United States is a party to a
given treaty would seem to be one factor in, but not the controlling
factor in determining, whether that treaty's provisions may be
considered part of customary international law. Indeed, as is
discussed below, treaties not yet ratified by the United States are
often raised against United States defendants using this very
approach.'21
Some courts manage this analysis correctly.'28 Many opinions
detention under the ATCA, on the grounds that several of the plaintiffs' claims
"constitute fully recognized violations of international law," including the International
Covenant).
Along the same lines, many courts have cited Judge Robert Bork's concurring
opinion in Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 799-823, for the proposition that no private right of
action exists under the International Covenant. In his concurrence, Judge Bork states not
only that no private cause of action exists under the Covenant, but also that no private
cause of action exists under the ATCA. See id.; see also White, 997 F. Supp. at 1383.
The White court relied upon the opinion in Tel-Oren to reach its decision that no private
right of action exists under the International Covenant and did not address the ATCA.
See White, 997 F. Supp. at 1383.
126 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
121 See discussion infra Part IV (C) (1), Using the ATCA to Bring Suit Under
Customary International Law.
128 See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that,
"where the lex loci delicti commissi is applied, it is an expression of comity to give effect
to the laws of the state where the wrong occurred .... Here, where ... the parties agree
that the acts alleged would violate Paraguayan law, and the policies of the forum are
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in this area, however, do not follow this pattern. Rather, when suit
is brought against foreign citizens in United States courts for
conduct occurring abroad under the customary international law
prong of the ATCA, the courts often undertake an exhaustive
analysis of the United States' obligations under whatever treaty is
being claimed to represent customary international law.'29 Again, I
consistent with the foreign law, state court jurisdiction would be proper") (citations and
footnote omitted). The court goes on to hold as follows:
Should the district court decide that the [choice of law] analysis requires it to
apply Paraguayan law, our courts will not have occasion to consider what law
would govern a suit under the Alien Tort Statute where the challenged conduct
is actionable under the law of the forum and the law of nations, but not the law
of the jurisdiction in which the tort occurred.
Id. at 889 (footnote omitted). See also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774,
791 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) ("Here, as in Filartiga, the action at issue
undoubtedly violated the law of the nation in which it occurred (in this case, the law of
Israel.") (citing Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 889)); Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 187 ("The fact that
the parameters of a norm otherwise recognized under international law are tied in this
country to constitutional interpretation .... does not compel the conclusion that no aspect
of the norm can qualify as international law. Where American constitutional law and
international law overlap, the voice of this country as part of the consensus rendering the
proposition in question a rule of international law is simply embodied in domestic
constitutional directives.").
129 See, e.g., Abebe-Jiri v. Negewo, No. I:90-CV-2010-GET, 1993 WL 814303, at
*4 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 20, 1993). Although what is alleged in the Abebe-Jiri case is a series
of wrongful acts on the part of an Ethiopian citizen, the court undertakes an analysis only
of the United States' own obligations under the Torture Convention, the treaty relevant
to that case, in reaching its decision to hold the defendant liable thereunder. See id. ("In
October 1990 the Senate gave its advice and consent to this Convention with the
reservation that the United State considers itself bound by Article 16 of the Convention
regarding cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment to the extent that this
term has the same meaning as the kind of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment
prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution."); see also Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, S. TREATY Doc.
No. 100-20 (1988), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027.
In addition, the concurring opinion by Judge Robert Bork in Tel-Oren creates
similar confusion. 26 F.2d at 808-09. Although the action was brought against a non-
United States defendant, Bork's opinion focuses on the fact that, although numerous
treaties are cited, the United States is a party only to a fraction of those under which suit
has been brought. Bork goes on to state that, "[o]f the five treaties in force, none
provides a private right of action." Id. at 809 (Bork, J., concurring).
The parties often, similarly, focus on the international obligations of the United
States. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880 n.7 (2d Cir. 1979) (citing the plaintiffs' theory that,
although they are proceeding primarily under customary international law (and even
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argue that the United States' own interpretation of its international
law obligations is of only limited importance in determining what
the law of nations requires.
One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that the
courts may believe the United States, through its ratification of the
treaty in question, now has an obligation to provide a neutral
forum for violations of the treaty, and that this obligation makes
the United States' status as a party to the treaty relevant to the
court's analysis. Indeed, many of the cases in which ATCA claims
are brought against foreign citizens for actions occurring abroad
speak of the importance of the United States' role as a neutral
forum.'30 Certainly, acting as a neutral forum is an important
function that American courts do and should serve.' 3' This
though they are suing a foreign citizen for conduct that took place in Paraguay), they also
believe their action arises under a treaty of the United States).
130 See, e.g., Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 879-80 (noting that, while the Defendant had
claimed "that Paraguayan law provides a full and adequate remedy for the wrong
alleged .... Dr. Filartiga has not commenced such an action .... believing that further
resort to the courts of his own country would be futile") (footnote omitted); Denegri v.
Republic of Chile, No. 86-3085, 1992 WL 91941, at *1 (D.D.C. April 6, 1992) ("The
families of [the torture victims] brought criminal charges in the Santiago civilian
courts.... However, plaintiffs state that because of the Pinochet regime's legal system it
would be impossible to ever obtain justice in that country.") (citation omitted); Xuncax,
886 F. Supp. at 169, 178 (D. Mass. 1995) (noting the plaintiffs' claims that they "have
been exiled from their native country" and have, without apparent success, attempted to
pursue the matter in a Guatemalan court).
'31 "Under the law of nations, states are obliged to make civil courts of justice
accessible for claims of foreign subjects against individuals within the state's territory."
Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 783 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW § 165a, at 366 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955)).
If the court's decision constitutes a denial of justice .... or if it appears to
condone the original wrongful act, under the law of nations the United States
would become responsible for the failure of its courts and be answerable not to
the injured alien but to his home state. A private act, committed by an individual
against an individual, might thereby escalate into an international confrontation.
Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 783 (citation omitted) (citing J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS
284-91 (4th ed. 1963)).
The language of the International Covenant itself lends further support to this
proposition. Article 2.1 provides as follows:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind,
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
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consideration, however, may easily cloud the relevant analysis
outlined above. Specifically, it is important to remember that,
although the courts of the United States may be available under
certain circumstances to individuals who have been wronged
elsewhere, such individuals cannot become possessed of greater
substantive rights by bringing suit in the United States than they
would have under the law of the country where the wrong
occurred. 
3 2
1. Using the ATCA to Bring Suit Under Customary
International Law
When either the United States is not a party to a treaty upon
which the plaintiffs wish to rely, or the United States is a party,
but the treaty is not self-executing, plaintiffs may use such treaties
as bases for suits under customary international law, using the
Alien Tort Claims Act to provide a jurisdictional basis for the
suit."'33 This approach, though flawed, remains the best option
national or social origin, property, birth, or other status.
International Covenant, supra note 2; see also United States v. Benitez, 28 F. Supp. 2d
1361, 1363-64 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (suggesting that the United Nations may have intended
for all human rights treaties to be self-executing).
132 See Tel-Oren, 726 F. 2d at 780 n.5 ("The Second Circuit [in Filartiga, 630 F.2d
at 887] read § 1350 'not as granting new rights to aliens, but simply as opening the
federal courts for adjudication of the rights already recognized by international law.'...
I construe this phrase to mean that aliens granted substantive rights under international
law may assert them under § 1350.").
133 See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 964 n.4 (11 th Cir. 1984) ("The fact that
the United States is a signatory to the latter document but not the former does not affect
amici's argument, since they do not assert claims founded on any self-executing source
of international law, but simply contend that these agreements represent part of the
modern background of international law against which the dimensions of the ... power
[to exclude aliens from the United States] must be defined."); Jama v. United States
Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 362 (D.N.J. 1998) ("None of
the treaties or other international instruments which plaintiffs have submitted are self-
executing. Plaintiffs recognize that these treaties do not per se provide a basis for suit
under the ATCA. Rather, they are submitted for another purpose-to support a law
under the 'law of nations' or international law, which is also a basis for an ATCA
action .... ); Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887, 903 & n.29 (N.D. Ga. 1985)
("Relying upon several international human rights agreements [including the
International Covenant, not then ratified by the U.S.], Plaintiffs established that
customary international law prohibits prolonged arbitrary detention .... Other courts
have regarded the same or similar international agreements as sources of rules of
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under current law for aliens suing other aliens under the
International Covenant in United States courts for wrongful acts
occurring outside the United States.
At least one court, however, holds that a plaintiff may not rely
upon customary international law when there is a treaty in effect
that may cover the same issues. In the case of In re Extradition of
Cheung, the court first rejects the defendant's attempt to avoid
extradition on treaty grounds, finding that the International
Covenant and the Covenant Against Torture are non-self-
executing."4 Second, the court rejects the customary international
law argument as well, holding that, "[o]nly 'where there is no
treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial
decision' will resort be made to customary international law.' 35
The Cheung case illustrates why using customary international law
to assert violations of the International Covenant is not sufficient.
In that case, the court holds that, "[s]ince there is a treaty that
provides for the conditions under which a relator may contest
extradition, customary international law will not apply."''36 If the
Covenant had been raised under the treaty prong, as I argue is the
preferable approach when it is available, a proper analysis would
have required that the Cheung court consider both the extradition
treaty and the International Covenant, each in light of the other,
rather than simply ignoring the Covenant.
To establish a claim under § 1350 using customary
international law, three substantive elements must be established:
"(1) an alien [must] sue[] (2) for a tort (3) committed in violation
customary international law."); Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880 n.7 (holding that Plaintiffs
"primarily rely upon treaties and other international instruments as evidence of an
emerging norm of customary international law, rather than independent sources of law").
Personal jurisdiction plays an important role in limiting those cases that ultimately are
brought in United States courts. Several of the cases cited above involve foreign
plaintiffs and defendants who came to the United States, sometimes many years after the
events giving rise to the litigation, to live and work.
'34 968 F. Supp. 791, 803 n.17 (D. Conn. 1997) (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. 677, 700 (1900)).
135 Cheung, 968 F. Supp. at 803 n.17. The Cheung court, in reaching its holding,
cites the venerable United States Supreme Court decision in The Paquete Habana. See
id. (citing 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)); see also discussion infra note 142 and
accompanying text.
136 Cheung, 968 F. Supp. at 803 n.17.
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of the law of nations."' 37 The court must also "determine whether
the alleged conduct sets forth a violation of the law of nations...
first, whether there is an applicable norm of international law and,
second, whether it has been violated."'38
Determining whether there is an applicable norm of
international law requires courts to determine what constitutes
customary international law (which is sometimes called the law of
nations).'39 Courts have defined the sources of customary
international law in a number of different ways. According to the
Restatement, "customary international law results from a general
137 Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 370 (E.D. La. 1997).
138 Id. (citing Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 184 (D. Mass. 1995));
Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1383 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing the same
test, quoting Trajano v. Marcos (In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights
Litig.), 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th Cir. 1992)).
139 It is important to distinguish customary international law and "the law of
nations" from jus cogens norms of international law" which are also mentioned in a
number of cases in this area. Unlike customary international law and the law of nations,
which are based upon the agreement of nations to be bound by certain principles, jus
cogens norms are not predicated upon consent. Rather, "U]us cogens norms of
international law comprise the body of laws that are considered so fundamental that they
are binding on all nations whether the nations have consented to them or not." Hawkins
v. Comparet-Cassani, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1255 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (citation omitted).
Thus, near-global acceptance of certain norms binds even those nations that have not
consented to them. See Nat'l Coalition Gov't v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 345 n.18
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (quoting Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699,
714 (9th Cir. 1992): The Court noted in National Coalition as follows:
As defined in the Vienna convention on the Law of Treaties, ajus cogens norm,
also known as a "peremptory norm" of international law, "is a norm accepted
and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character. ...
While jus cogens and customary international law are related, they differ in one
important respect. Customary international law, like international law defined
by treaties and other international agreements, rests on the consent of states."
Id. See also Hawkins, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1255 (citing Siderman, 965 F.2d at 714-15) ("To
determine the scope of jus cogens international law, courts look to several different
sources including treaties, state practice, legal decisions, and works of noted jurists."); cf.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d. Cir. 1980) (in the customary international
law context, holding that "[t]he requirement that a rule command 'the general assent of
civilized nations' to become binding upon them all is a stringent one. Were this not so,
the courts of one nation might feel free to impose idiosyncratic legal rules upon others, in
the name of applying international law").
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and consistent practice of states which is followed by them from a
sense of legal obligation."''  The Restatement provides as follows,
with regard to the sources of international law:
In determining whether a rule has become international law,
substantial weight is accorded to
judgments and opinions of international judicial and arbitral
tribunals;
judgments and opinions of national judicial tribunals;
the writings of scholars; [and]
pronouncements by states that undertake to state a rule of
international law, when such pronouncements are not
seriously challenged by other states. '4
Perhaps the most-cited formulation of what constitutes customary
international law, however, is found in The Paquete Habana,
which states as follows:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction
as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there
is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages
of civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of
jurists and commentators who by years of labor, research, and
experience have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted
with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to
by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors
concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy
evidence of what the law really is.'
42
Other courts have employed similar formulations. 43
140 Jama, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 362 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 102 (2) (1987)); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672
F. Supp. 1531, 1540 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (for the same holding, quoting United States v.
Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820)). The court further holds that "[t]he law of
nations 'may be ascertained by consulting the work of jurists, writing professedly on
public law; or by the general use and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions
recognizing and enforcing that law."' 22 F. Supp. 2d at 362.
141 RESTATEMENT, supra note 44, at § 103 (2).
142 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (citation omitted).
143 See, e.g., Jama, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 362 ("Highly relevant to the inquiry whether
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Applying the formulas used by the courts in this section, for a
litigant to establish that the provisions of the International
Covenant upon which he has relied constitute customary
international law, it will be helpful to refer not only to the
existence of the treaty, but also to other sources in which the same
or similar provisions are treated as binding, such as judicial
opinions, law review articles, other international law instruments,
and international custom. 44 Because determining what constitutes
customary international law requires a court to consider the
collective weight of many sources and does not contemplate the
court's relying upon a single item such the International Covenant,
using the International Covenant to prove a violation of customary
international law is a flawed approach. As the result the court
reached in the case of In re Extradition of Cheung illustrates, a
treaty is less effective than it should be when it is applied as
customary international law.'45 The United States, in ratifying the
international law confers a fundamental right upon all people are treaties (such as the
United Nations Charter), internationally or regionally adopted covenants or declarations
of human rights and foreign policy goals of the United States and other countries in the
field of human rights."); Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 184 (stating that "courts are guided by
'the usage of nations, judicial opinions and the works of jurists' as 'the sources from
which customary international law is derived"') (citing Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884); Jean
v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 964 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that "diplomatic protests,
international arbitrations, and court decisions" are other ways to establish customary
international law); In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 603 F. Supp. 1468, 1477 n.5 (N.D.
Ohio 1985) ("'International law' develops from a number of sources, including treaties
and conventions, international declarations and charters, and the customs and usages of
civilized nations.") (citations omitted); Martinez, 141 F.3d at 1383-84 (9th Cir. 1997)
("For guidance regarding the norms of international law, courts may look to court
decisions, the work of jurists and the usage of nations.") (citing Siderman, 965 F.2d at
714-15); Nat'l Coalition Gov't, 176 F.R.D. at 345 ("The norms of the law of nations are
found by consulting juridical writings on public law, considering the general practice of
nations, and referring to judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing international law.")
(citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995)).
144 As an aside, however, at least one court has found that the absence of case law
on point may actually help support an argument that a certain standard is part of
customary international law. See Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic,
830 F.2d 421, 424 (2d Cir. 1987). In finding that "it is beyond controversy that attacking
a neutral ship in international waters, without proper cause for suspicion or investigation,
violates international law," the court held that "the relative paucity of cases litigating this
customary rule of international law underscores the longstanding nature of this aspect of
freedom of the high seas." Id.
14s See 968 F. Supp. 791, 803 (D. Conn. 1997).
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International Covenant, made a very specific set of promises to the
international community.'4 6 For these specific promises now to be
diluted by being considered as simply some evidence of customary
international law, weakens the Covenant in a manner that is
inconsistent with its status as the "supreme Law of the Land" and
a major international human rights treaty. In addition, because at
least one court rejects a litigant's attempt to present an
International Covenant claim under customary international law,
given the existence of another treaty on point, using the Covenant
in this manner is not only inappropriate, but also risky.'47 Since no
cause of action is available in United States courts under the
ATCA's treaty prong for actions against non-United States actors,
however, bringing suit under the customary international law
prong remains the best approach available for such actions under
current law.
2. Using the ATCA to Provide Enabling Legislation for
the International Covenant.
The final approach to the non-self-executing problem is to use
the treaty prong of the Alien Tort Claims Act to bring an
International Covenant claim. This approach is available only for
claims by alien plaintiffs against United States defendants. The
essence of this argument is that the Alien Tort Claims Act may
provide the enabling legislation that was omitted from the
International Covenant.'48 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia '49 recently approved this argument,
which is inspired in part by the United States Court of Appeals for
146 See generally SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE INT'L
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, S. EXEC. REP. No. 102-23, at 10-24 (1992),
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 645-61.
141 See Cheung, 968 F. Supp. at 803.
148 One court's opinion and one treatise make reference to the possibility of making
the argument I present in this section. I have not, however, seen it explored or explained
at any length. See Jama, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 365. ("It is plaintiffs' position that the ATCA
constitutes the implementing legislation with respect to ICCPR and read together ICCPR
and ATCA constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity under ATCA."). The Jama court
decides the case before it, however, on sovereign immunity grounds and does not
address the "implementing legislation" argument. See id; see also STEPHENS & RATNER,
supra note 123, at 58-60 (1996).
49 See Ralk v. Lincoln County, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. Ga. 2000).
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the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Abebe-Jiri v. Negewo" °
Although the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Abebe-Jiri provides
almost no analysis of the court's holding, the court allows the
Alien Tort Claims Act to provide the enabling legislation to
support the plaintiff's International Covenant claim.'5'
At the lower court level in Abebe-Jiri v. Negewo,"' the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia addresses
civil claims by two Canadian citizens and one Ethiopian citizen
against an Ethiopian political official. These claims are based upon
cruel and inhumane treatment and torture the plaintiffs and their
families suffered during the "Red Terror" in Ethiopia in 1977 and
1978. "' The plaintiffs' claims are brought under the ATCA.'54 In
evaluating the plaintiffs' ATCA claim, the court holds as follows:
The Alien Tort Statute ... provides for subject matter
jurisdiction in cases brought by aliens for "torts committed in
violation of the law of nations." In this case, the wrongs claimed
by plaintiffs are torts under international law... The
evidence.., establishes that each of the plaintiffs was subjected
to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. The
prohibition against such treatment is found in all of the major
human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights .... "'
Having found violations by the defendants of the International
Covenant and the Convention on Torture, both instruments to
which the United States is a party, the court awards plaintiffs both
compensatory and punitive damages on their ATCA claim.'56
150 72 F.3d 844 (1 1th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 830 (1996). Notably, the
Eleventh Circuit is among those circuits that have found a private right of action under
the ATCA. See supra note 125 (explaining why this background is critical to the analysis
on which this article rests).
151 See Abebe-Jiri, 72 F.3d at 848. Because, however, the Abebe-Jiri case involves a
suit against a foreign citizen, I acknowledge that the correct approach in that case would
have been to bring suit under the customary international law prong of the ATCA. See 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
152 No. I:90-CV-2010-GET, 1993 WL 814304 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 20, 1993), aff'd, 72
F.3d 844 (11 th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 830 (1996).
153 See id. at *1.
114 See id. at *4.
155 Id.
156 Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit has now affirmed the District Court's
holding.' 7 The Eleventh Circuit specifically rejects the defendant's
argument that no private right of action exists under the ATCA.'58
The court holds that "the Alien Tort Claims Act confers both a
forum and a private right of action to aliens alleging a violation of
international law."'59 Although the court's opinion includes much
of the language traditionally associated with a customary
international law analysis, the court does not allow the plaintiff's
International Covenant claim under the first, or "customary
international law" prong of the ATCA, but rather, under the
second, or "treaty" prong of the Act. The Eleventh Circuit does
not engage in the traditional customary international law analysis,
in affirming the plaintiff's International Covenant claim. Indeed,
rather than employing the Beanal test for a customary
international law claim, which is described above, or taking into
account judicial opinions, scholarly works, and other treaties, for
example, the court simply relies upon the two international law
instruments, the International Covenant and the Torture
Convention, in reaching its decision.' ° Such a direct approach is
not contemplated by the normal customary international law
analysis, and this fact compels the conclusion that the court
proceeded under the ATCA's treaty prong, instead. The United
States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia recently
affirmed this interpretation of the Abebe-Jiri decision.''
For reasons untenable, the treaty prong of the Alien Tort
Claims Act has been largely ignored:
The ATCA permits suits for torts in violation of the "law of
nations" and for torts in violation of "a treaty of the United
States." The recent cases from Filartiga forward have relied
17 Abebe-Jiri, 72 F.3d at 848.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 See id. at 845; see generally Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp.
362, 370 (E.D. La. 1997); see also discussion supra notes 137-38 (demonstrating the
traditional customary international law analysis).
161 See Ralk v. Lincoln County, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1380 (S.D. Ga. 2000) ("On the
basis of the Eleventh Circuit's Abebe-Jiri decision, it appears to the Court that [the
plaintiff] could bring a claim under the Alien Tort Claims Act for violations of the
ICCPR.").
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almost entirely upon demonstrating that the torts sued upon
violate the law of nations, even though many of the torts that
violate customary international law also violate treaties and
conventions to which the United States is a party. The reluctance
to argue that torts violate the treaty provision of the ATCA has
forced plaintiffs to engage in the much more complex exercise
of demonstrating violations of the law of nations. ... The
paucity of § 1350 cases brought as violations of treaties reflects
U.S. judicial hostility to enforcing treaties at the behest of
private parties.1
62
The most logical reading of the treaty prong of the Alien Tort
Claims Act is that it presents an additional and valid, approach to
employing the International Covenant in light of the non-self-
execution declaration. One argument for enforcing, rather than
ignoring, this part of the Act is that the treaty prong language, if it
is interpreted otherwise, will be rendered a nullity. Because the
historical approach of the United States to statutory interpretation
generally requires a reader to assume that no part of a statute is a
nullity, this approach compels United States courts to consider the
appropriate meaning of the treaty prong.'63 The most reasonable
meaning of this prong is that it provides a second means by which
claims may be brought for the violation of non-self-executing
international treaties:
Despite the courts' restrictive view of treaty enforcement, § 1350
does present the litigator with valid arguments to avoid the "self-
executing" requirement. The argument begins with the premise
that no language in § 1350 should be read as a nullity or as
redundant: the treaty branch of the statute, therefore, was
included for a purpose. Since "self-executing" treaties can be
enforced under the "arising under" jurisdiction of § 1331, the
treaty provision of § 1350 would serve no purpose if it were
limited to such "self-executing" treaties and would, in effect, be
deleted from the statute. Therefore, in order to give meaning to
the treaty provision of the ATCA, it must be read as allowing
162 STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 123, at 58-59 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
163 See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Edwards, J., concurring) ("There is a fundamental principle of statutory construction
that a statute should not be construed so as to render any part of it 'inoperative or
superfluous, void or insignificant ... ') (citation omitted).
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enforcement of some treaties that are not self-executing.164
When it is available, the treaty prong of the Alien Tort Claims
Act is the best way, under current law, for alien plaintiffs to bring
suit under the International Covenant. This approach is preferable
to the customary international law approach because it avoids
inappropriate dilution of the promises of the Covenant and avoids
the problem, illustrated by the Cheung holding, of ignoring the
Covenant when another treaty exists on point.' 6' As explained
above, the treaty prong is available only in actions by alien
plaintiffs against United States defendants.
66
164 STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 123, at 59-60 (footnotes omitted).
165 See In re Extradition of Cheung, 968 F. Supp. 791, 803 (D. Conn. 1997).
166 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994). If the Alien Tort Claims Act may indeed be used to
bring suit on behalf of "alien" plaintiffs, one interesting question is who may be deemed
an "alien" within the meaning of the Act. Can, for instance, the Act be used to allow
Native Americans to bring suit under the International Covenant?
Historically, American courts "labeled the indigenous population as 'aliens and
foreigners,' notwithstanding that Euro-Americans entered the country, more recently, as
immigrants." Guadalupe T. Luna, Chicana/Chicano Land Tenure in the Agrarian
Domain: On the Edge of a "Naked" Knife, 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 39, n.162 (1998)
(citing Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 419-20 (1856), superseded by
U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV); see also Jonathan C. Drimmer, The Nephews of Uncle
Sam: The History, Evolution, and Application of Birthright Citizenship in the United
States, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 667, 690 (1995) (citing Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404, for the
proposition that "Native Americans were aliens who could only become citizens through
federal naturalization procedures"). "[U]nlike other children of aliens born on United
States soil who formed a birthright compact with the national community regardless of
their parentage, Native Americans, like Asian-Americans, could not be birthright
citizens." Drimmer, supra, at 691.
Although Congress passed the Dawes Act in 1924, granting birthright citizenship to
Native Americans, it has been said that Native Americans still are not recognized as
Fourteenth Amendment Citizens, but rather as "statutory citizens" who enjoy somewhat
fewer rights and privileges than "Constitutional citizens." See 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (1994);
Anna Williams Shavers, A Century of Developing Citizenship Law and the Nebraska
Influence: A Centennial Essay, 70 NEB. L. REV. 462, 515 (1991) ("There are
consequences attached to the method of acquiring citizenship, resulting indisparate (sic)
treatment. Any category of statutory citizenship is subject to amendment or even
repeal."). It is, for example, unclear whether a statutory citizen is eligible to be President.
See id. at 515 ("The Supreme Court has stated that 'naturalized' citizens are ineligible
for the Presidency. Therefore, if statutory citizens are considered to be naturalized
citizens, rather than birth-right citizens, they would not be eligible for the presidency.")
(footnote omitted).
Along the same lines, the United States recognizes two doctrines of birthright
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3. An Argument of Last Resort-Using the Covenant to
Interpret Existing Domestic Law
Finally, even if a party is unsuccessful in using the arguments
this article has presented to bring suit under the International
Covenant, she should be able to use the International Covenant to
interpret existing domestic law. Even before the International
Covenant was ratified, American courts employed the Covenant in
citizenship, jus soli and jus sanguinus. "Jus soli-citizenship by soil, is a doctrine that
confers citizenship to a person based on the place of birth. An inquiry into individual
intent is generally unnecessary." Id. at 468. "Jus sanguinus--citizenship by blood or
descent, confers citizenship based upon the citizenship of the person's parents at the time
of birth." Id. Shavers goes on to state that "[c]itizenship can be acquired jus soli by every
race and nationality except Native Americans pursuant to the fourteenth amendment." Id.
at 516. In addition, Native Americans are "the only group of statutory citizens born in
the United States." Id. at 518.
In sum, it appears uncontroversial that "Native Americans have a unique
relationship with the Federal Government." Ali v. Reno, 829 F. Supp. 1415, 1427
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 408 (1980)
(holding that the federal government acts as a guardian of Native American interests);
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383 (1886) ("These Indian tribes are the wards
of the nation."); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (holding
that Native Americans' "relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his
guardian")). The Cherokee Nation court, for instance, described the Native American
Nations as not "foreign nations" but "domestic dependent nations." Shavers, supra, at
482 (citing Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831)).
In addition, another international law concept, that of the "law of nations,"
previously has been applied to Native Americans. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515, 560-61 (1832) (citing the "law of nations" in its holding that Native Americans
were excluded from state law, and could exercise their own rights of sovereignty, so long
as they were consistent with federal law). Further, Native Americans are expressly
treated as aliens for some purposes, even today. See Katherine J. Wise, A Matter of
Trust: The Elimination of Federally Funded Legal Services On the Navajo Nation, 21
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 157, 167-68 (1997) (citing FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 117 (Five Rings 1986) (reprint of Univ. of N.M. photo. reprint
1971) (1942) for the proposition that "It is a general rule that Native Americans outside
of Native American lands are subject to the laws of the state in which they find
themselves to the same extent that an alien would be subject to those laws").
In conclusion, it remains an open question to what extent, if any, Native Americans
may be deemed "aliens" within the meaning of the Alien Tort Claims Act. It seems clear,
however, that sufficient evidence exists to make a reasonable argument that the Act
should provide a cause of action for Native Americans who might wish to bring suit
under non-self-executing international treaties such as the International Covenant. This
argument seems to flow naturally from the ways in which the United States government
continues its disparate treatment of Native Americans.
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this manner. In the case of Lipscomb v. Simmons, for example, the
court used the International Covenant, which the United States had
not yet then ratified, to find a violation of the constitutional right
to associate with family members.' 67 Along the same lines, in
Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court used the International
Covenant to find that execution of the juvenile defendant would be
unconstitutional.' 68 With this possibility in mind, even if a litigant
is unsuccessful in raising her International Covenant claim
directly, the court should consider the Covenant in interpreting
domestic law. Although United States courts have effectively
written out those portions of the International Covenant that might
impose protections beyond those already provided by the United
States Constitution, it is ironic to note that the International
Covenant has, for many years and even prior to the United States'
ratification of the treaty, been used quietly to expand the
Constitution.
V. Conclusion
The United States' issuance of a valid declaration that the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is to be
167 884 F.2d 1242, 1244 n.1 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that "[t]his right is so
fundamental that it has been recognized in the ... International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights .... among other international human rights agreements").
168 487 U.S. 815, 831 n.34 (1987); see also Hinkie v. United States, 715 F.2d 96, 98
n.3 (3d. Cir. 1983) ("[T]he complaint alleges conduct which would violate.., the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.... The international consensus
against involuntary human experimentation is clear. A fortiori the conduct charged, if it
occurred, was in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States and of the
state where it occurred or where its effects were felt."); Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622
F. Supp. 887, 903 n.29 (N.D. Ga. 1985) ("Among the various international instruments
on which plaintiffs rely [in their habeas corpus petition] are the... International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights .... Other Courts have regarded the same or
similar international agreements as sources of rules of customary international law.");
Comments on United States of America, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess.,
1413th mtg., 11, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/ Add.50 (1995) ("The Committee takes note of
the position expressed by the delegation that, notwithstanding the non-self-executing
declaration of the United States, American courts are not prevented from seeking
guidance from the Covenant in interpreting American law."); Todd Howland, Rael v.
Taylor and the Colorado Constitution: How Human Rights Law Ensures Constitutional
Protection in the Private Sphere, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. AND POL'Y 1, 12 (1997) ("[T]he
Senate looks to the interpretation of current law to reflect any modification required by
the ICCPR."); Neier, supra note 56, at 1237.
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deemed non-self-executing precludes an across-the-board
application of the Covenant in United States courts at this time.
Indeed, perhaps the best long-term solution is a political one, in
which Senators are urged to allow treaties to provide the rights and
protections they promise, by either declaring that they are to be
self-executing or by refraining from declaring that they are not and
permitting the courts to decide this issue. In the meantime, the task
remains to determine what effect the Covenant may appropriately
have in United States courts today. Currently, consistent with both
the Senate Declaration and the body of case law that has
developed in this area, the Alien Tort Claims Act may be used to
provide alien plaintiffs with a cause of action under the
International Covenant.'69 When suit is brought against alien
defendants, it should be approached under the customary
international law prong of the Act; when suit is brought against
United States defendants, the treaty prong of the Act should be
employed. One possible area in which this approach, though
insufficient to provide a global solution, may be expanded is by
further exploring the extent to which plaintiffs other than foreign
citizens, such as Native Americans, might fall within the Act's
definition of "alien." Ultimately, I hope that by showing that the
best use of the International Covenant at this time is an incomplete
solution that compromises the intent of the treaty, this article will
encourage reform in the United States' flawed treaty-making
process to effectuate fairer and more humane results in the future.
169 American plaintiffs, unfortunately, must continue to bring suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, with all of its limitations. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
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Appendix
Analysis of International Covenant Caselaw to Date
I. Twenty-Three Cases Against American Defendants:
A. Five decided on other grounds:
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor, Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 485 (D.N.J.
Sept. 14, 1999) (Statute of limitations); Soroa-Gonzales v.
Civiletti, 515 F. Supp. 1049, 1061 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (C.F.R.
violation); United Mexican States v. Woods, 126 F. 3d 1220,
1223-24 (9th Cir. 1997) (Eleventh Amendment); Hinkie v. United
States, 715 F.2d 96, 99 (3d. Cir. 1983) (Feres doctrine); United
States v. Bakeas, 987 F. Supp. 44, 46 (D. Mass. 1997)
(International Covenant raised in dicta of sentencing case).
B. Three held that the International Covenant provides no
more protection than the United States Constitution:
Inupiat Cmty. v. United States, 746 F.2d 570, 571-72 (9th Cir.
1984); Crow v. Gullet, 706 F.2d 856, 858 (8th Cir. 1983); Ralk v.
Lincoln County, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1382-83 (S.D. Ga. 2000).
C. Eight rejected the claim due to the Non-Self-Executing
Declaration:
Langworthy v. Dean, 37 F. Supp. 2d 417, 423 (D. Md. 1999);
White v. Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380, 1384-85 (E.D. Wash. 1998);
In re Extradition of Cheung, 968 F. Supp. 791, 803 (D. Conn.
1997); Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 10 (1st Cir.
1994); Dickens v. Lewis, 750 F.2d 1251, 1254 (5th Cir. 1984);
Heinrich v. Sweet, 49 F. Supp. 2d 27, 42 (D. Mass. 1999); Kyler
v. Montezuma County, No. 99-1052, 2000 WL 93996, at *1 (10th
Cir. Jan. 28, 2000); Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, 33 F. Supp. 2d
1244, 1256-57 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
D. Two used the International Covenant to construe
constitutional rights:
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 831 (1988); Lipscomb
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v. Simmons, 884 F.2d 1242, 1244 (9th Cir. 1989).
F. Two used the International Covenant as part of customary
international law, under the Alien Tort Claims Act:
Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887, 903 (N.D. Ga.
1985); Jama v. United States Immigration and Naturalization
Serv., 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 365 (D.N.J. 1998).
G. One used the International Covenant defensively without
requiring enabling legislation:
Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206, 231-32 (E.D.N.Y.
1999).
H. Two found no conflict between the International Covenant
and domestic law:
Freedom to Travel Campaign v. Newcomb, 82 F.3d 1431,
1441-42 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Benitez, 28 F. Supp. 2d
1361, 1364 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
II. Four Cases Against Non-U.S. Defendants:
A. One involved a suit against a foreign nation (and thus
raised a different set of issues not relevant to this article):
Denegri v. Republic of Chile, No. 86-3085, 1992 WL 91914,
at *3 (D.D.C. April 6, 1992).
B. Two used the International Covenant, under the Alien Tort
Claims Act, to raise issues of customary international law:
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884-85 (2d. Cir. 1980);
Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 185-86 (D. Mass. 1995).
C. One used the International Covenant under the treaty
prong of the Alien Tort Claims Act:
Abebe-Jiri v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11 th Cir. 1996).

